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UNICORN STOCK OPTIONS—GOLDEN
GOOSE OR TROJAN HORSE?
Anat Alon-Beck*
Large privately held startups valued at $1 billion or more
(“unicorns”) are grappling with how to deal with employees’
expectations caused by the illiquidity of the shares of stock
acquired upon exercise of their options. Until about eight years
ago, many talented workers chose to work for a startup
company for a lower cash salary combined with a substantial
stock option grant and the dream of cashing out for a large
sum of money after an initial public offering (“IPO”) of the
startup’s stock.
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Today, unicorns remain private for extended periods of
time, in part, because they are often no longer dependent on an
IPO or a trade sale to raise sufficient capital. As a result, they
are delaying liquidity events for their founders, employees, and
investors, thereby causing their employee stock options to lose
some of their allure as a hiring and retention device.
This Article examines a contemporary puzzle in Silicon
Valley: Is there a shift in unicorn employees’ expectations that
results in labor contract renegotiations? To answer this
question, this Article explores the challenges faced by unicorn
firms as repeat players in competitive technology markets and
offers the following possible solutions. First, it proposes new
equity-based compensation contracts, and critiques them.
Second, it suggests alternatives to the traditional liquidity
mechanisms, and critiques them. Unfortunately, current
securities and tax laws create legal barriers to private
ordering, which prevent the parties from solving these issues
on their own. This Article concludes with proposals to remove
these legal barriers to private ordering to allow for the
proposed solutions to take hold, accompanied with new
mandatory disclosure requirements to limit the risks.
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“[W]e have thousands of employees that own stock
[who gave] their blood, sweat, and tears to make Uber
a great company. . . . I say we are going to IPO as late
as humanly possible. It’ll be one day before my
employees and significant others come to my office
with pitchforks and torches.”
– Travis Kalanick, former CEO of Uber1

1 Sam Shead, Uber’s CEO Says He’s Leaving It ‘As Late as Humanly
Possible’
to
Go
Public,
BUS.
INSIDER
(June
9,
2016),
https://www.businessinsider.com/uber-ceo-travis-kalanick-ipo-plan-2016-6
[https://perma.cc/6SJG-N8L5].
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“One of the many tradeoffs that early startup
employees choose to make is between cash, and
options. For some employees, however, this may end
up being a Faustian bargain of sorts.”
– Scott Kupor, managing partner of Andreessen
Horowitz2

I.

INTRODUCTION: NEW “TECH BUBBLE”
PUZZLE

With the declining U.S. market for initial public offerings
(“IPOs”),3 caused in part by the availability of new private
capital sources,4 there has been a corresponding rise in the
2 Scott Kupor, The Lack of Options for (Startup Employees’) Options,
ANDREESSEN
HOROWITZ
(June
23,
2013),
https://a16z.com/
2016/06/23/options-timing/ [https://perma.cc/ZZ3D-V4TQ].
3 The decline in IPOs has gained attention from the media,
policymakers, and academics. See Oversight of the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission: Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous., &
Urban Affairs, 115th Cong. 39–41 (2017) (statement of Jay Clayton,
Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission); Elisabeth de Fontenay,
The Deregulation of Private Capital and the Decline of the Public Company,
68 HASTINGS L.J. 445, 454–55 (2017); Adley Bowden & Andy White, Private
vs. Public Market Investors: Who’s Reaping the Gains from the Rise of
Unicorns?,
PRIV.
MKT.
PLAYBOOK,
Q2
2018,
at
4–7,
https://files.pitchbook.com/website/files/pdf/2Q_2018_PitchBook_PlayBook
_Digital.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WF9-L2S5]; Corrie Driebusch, IPO Market
Isn’t Quite Back as Many Startups Are Still Holding Out, WALL ST. J. (July
5, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ipo-market-isnt-quite-back-as-manystartups-are-still-holding-out-1499252401 (on file with the Columbia
Business Law Review); Scott Kupor, Where Have All the IPOs Gone,
ANDREESSEN HOROWITZ (June 19, 2017), https://a16z.com/2017/06/19/ipos/
[https://perma.cc/A6MV-Y329]; Keith Wright, Silicon Valley Tech Bubble Is
Larger Than It Was in 2000, and the End Is Coming, CNBC (May 22, 2018),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/22/tech-bubble-is-larger-than-in-2000-andthe-end-is-coming.html [https://perma.cc/V6D7-DA5W].
4 See Sergey Chernenko, Josh Lerner & Yao Zeng, Mutual Funds as
Venture Capitalists? Evidence from Unicorns (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working
Paper No. 18-037, 2017), https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20
Files/18-037_02aee6d2-1209-449e-84df-c3730b4d7b4b.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RUR9-T2Y8]; Les Brorsen, Looking Behind the Declining
Number of Public Companies, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN.
REG. (May 18, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/18/looking-
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number of privately held firms that are valued at $1 billion or
more (so-called “unicorns”).5 Whereas, in the recent past,
startups tended to go public or be sold approximately four
years after founding, today the average time to IPO or sale is
eleven years.6
behind-the-declining-number-of-public-companies/
[https://perma.cc/N8KX-ZLY5]; Matt Levine, Opinion, Unicorns Take
Different Paths to Being Public, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 27, 2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-03-27/unicorns-takedifferent-paths-to-being-public [https://perma.cc/PJH3-NLGZ] (“[L]atestage private investors now are doing the job that the post-IPO public
investors used to do[.]”); MCKINSEY & CO., THE RISE AND RISE OF PRIVATE
MARKETS: MCKINSEY GLOBAL PRIVATE MARKETS REVIEW 2018, at 1 (2018),
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Industries/Private
%20Equity%20and%20Principal%20Investors/Our%20Insights/The%20ris
e%20and%20rise%20of%20private%20equity/The-rise-and-rise-of-privatemarkets-McKinsey-Global-Private-Markets-Review-2018.ashx
[https://perma.cc/YP2H-VUEB] (“Private asset managers raised a record
sum of nearly $750 billion globally, extending a cycle that began eight years
ago.”).
5 A unicorn has the following features for the purposes of this Article:
young but large, privately owned but “quasi-public,” invests in research and
development (R&D) with intangible assets, venture capital-backed with
concentrated ownership and controlling shareholders, and valued at over $1
billion. The term “unicorn” was coined in 2013 by Aileen Lee. See Aileen
Lee, Welcome to the Unicorn Club: Learning from Billion-Dollar Startups,
TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 2, 2013), https://techcrunch.com/2013/11/02/welcome-tothe-unicorn-club/ [https://perma.cc/7WQP-NG6S]; see also Abraham J.B.
Cable, Fool’s Gold? Equity Compensation & the Mature Startup, 11 VA. L. &
BUS. REV. 613, 615 (2017); Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure
and the New Private Economy, 57 B.C. L. REV. 583, 586 (2016).
6 See Jamie Hutchinson, Why Are More Companies Staying Private?,
GOODWIN (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/hutch
inson-goodwin-presentation-acsec-021517.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3MP98FTM]; see also Begum Erdogan, Rishi Kant, Allen Miller & Kara Sprague,
Grow Fast or Die Slow: Why Unicorns Are Staying Private, MCKINSEY & CO.
(May
2016),
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/high-tech/ourinsights/grow-fast-or-die-slow-why-unicorns-are-staying-private
[https://perma.cc/RD4K-MDUD]; Matt Levine, Unicorn Buybacks and
Securities
Law,
BLOOMBERG
(Feb.
16,
2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-02-16/unicorn-buybacksand-securities-law (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review). For
more information on the decline in the U.S. IPO market, see generally Craig
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Eight years ago, it was inconceivable that a venture capital
(“VC”)-backed startup could reach an aggressive valuation of
over $1 billion without going public.7 But today CB Insights,
CNNMoney, Fortune, and The Wall Street Journal each keep
a list of such companies and their valuations, and the lists
keep growing.8 The United States has the largest
concentration of unicorns in the world, and an estimated $700
Doidge, Kathleen M. Kahle, G. Andrew Karolyi & René M. Stulz, Eclipse of
the Public Corporation or Eclipse of the Public Markets?, J. APPLIED CORP.
FIN., Winter 2018, at 8 [hereinafter Doidge et al., Eclipse of the Public
Corporation]; Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi & René M. Stulz, The U.S.
Left Behind? Financial Globalization and the Rise of IPOs Outside the U.S.,
110 J. FIN. ECON. 546 (2013) [hereinafter Doidge et al., The U.S. Left
Behind]; Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi & René M. Stulz, The U.S.
Listing Gap, 123 J. FIN. ECON. 464 (2017) [hereinafter Doidge et al., The
U.S. Listing Gap]; Xiaohui Gao, Jay R. Ritter & Zhongyan Zhu, Where Have
All the IPOs Gone?, 48 J. FIN. &. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1663 (2013).
7 See David Cogman & Alan Lau, The ‘Tech Bubble’ Puzzle, MCKINSEY
Q., no. 3, at 103, 104 (2016).
8 See Scott Austin, Chris Canipe & Sarah Slobin, The Billion Dollar
Startup Club, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/graphics/billion-dollar-club/
(on file with the Columbia Business Law Review) (last updated Dec. 2018)
(showing list and valuation of firms as of Dec. 2018); Billion Dollar Startups,
CNN
TECH,
https://money.cnn.com/interactive/technology/
billion-dollar-startups/ [https://perma.cc/MR2M-7598] (last updated June
29,
2018);
The
Global
Unicorn
Club,
CB
INSIGHTS,
https://www.cbinsights.com/research-unicorn-companies
[https://perma.cc/4S6H-TZKB];
The
Unicorn
List,
FORTUNE,
http://fortune.com/unicorns/ [https://perma.cc/F7HC-MX64] (last updated
Jan. 19, 2016); see also Ben Zimmer, How ‘Unicorns’ Became Silicon Valley
Companies, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 20, 2015) http://www.wsj.com/articles/howunicorns-became-silicon-valley-companies-1426861606 (on file with the
Columbia Business Law Review). Companies that are valued at over $10
billion are called “decacorns”. See Sarah Frier & Eric Newcomer, The Fuzzy,
Insane Math That’s Creating So Many Billion-Dollar Tech Companies,
BLOOMBERG
(Mar.
17,
2015),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-17/the-fuzzy-insanemath-that-s-creating-so-many-billion-dollar-tech-companies (on file with
the Columbia Business Law Review) (coining the term decacorns); see also
Jillian D’Onfro, There Are So Many $10 Billion Startups That There’s a New
Name for Them: ‘Decacorns’, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 18, 2015),
http://www.businessinsider.com/decacorn-is-the-new-unicorn-2015-3
[https://perma.cc/8VFS-GDGT].
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billion in unrealized value “is currently locked up in” these
firms.9 By staying private and not pursuing an IPO or sale,
unicorns are delaying liquidity events for their shareholders,
including their employees.10
High employee turnover hurts a firm’s bottom line.
Unicorn firms are dealing with the highest turnover rates of
knowledgeable employees among tech disruptors.11 despite
the fact that they generally offer their employees a
competitive salary and the highest annual equity awards. 12
This raises the question—even though unicorns do not need
public markets to raise money, do they need them to attract,
engage, and retain their talent?
This Article builds on the work of Rock and Wachter13 and
postulates that capital lock-in is important for startup
9 In 2017 alone, “22% of the capital invested in the US was part of a
deal valuing a company at $1 billion or more.” See PITCHB OOK, UNICORN
REPORT 2017 ANNUAL 3 (2017) https://pitchbook.com/news/reports/2017annual-unicorn-report (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review).
10 See Erdogan et al., supra note 6 (“[P]rivate-market activity has
ticked up significantly as employees and investors alike seek liquidity.”); see
also Andy Kessler, Opinion, Unicorns Need IPOs, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 7, 2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/unicorns-need-ipos-1515361043 (on file with
the Columbia Business Law Review) (“The economy needs this. The more
companies are publicly traded, the more information quickly gets into the
market. This is especially important in innovative industries. And for
several years now, venture capitalists have been putting more into startups
than they have been taking out in exits. That can’t last forever. Capitalism
can’t perform at its highest potential with large opaque companies.”).
11 See Amir Efrati & Peter Schultz, How Tech Firms Stack on Pay,
INFORMATION (Sept. 13, 2016), https://www.theinformation.com/articles/
how-tech-firms-stack-up-on-pay [https://perma.cc/GA3C-RGDY]; see also
Tim Johnson, The Real Problem with Tech Professionals: High Turnover,
FORBES (June 29, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesbusiness
developmentcouncil/2018/06/29/the-real-problem-with-tech-professionalshigh-turnover/#37ddb3164201 [https://perma.cc/GRE2-BGT4].
12 This Article uses the terms “equity awards” or “compensation”
broadly to include promises of equity (whether stock options or restricted
stock units).
13 The private startup company legal form is set to “lock-in parties
while developing vulnerable match-specific assets.” Edward B. Rock &
Michael L. Wachter, Waiting for the Omelet to Set: Match-Specific Assets
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companies, including large unicorns, because the cost of
investing in innovation-driven products or services is very
high and risky. In order to allow startup firms to continue to
raise capital, investors cannot easily threaten to exit and to
withdraw their investment from the firm. It is thus important
to turn to the changes in the market, the rise in investors with
aggressive redemption rights, and the ways this rise changes
the traditional governance structure of VC-backed unicorn
firms.
But there has been relatively little discussion in the
literature on how changes to U.S. capital markets and recent
legislation affect the behavior of unicorns as a repeat player
in competitive technology markets, where companies
aggressively compete for talent—i.e., knowledgeable
employees.14 This Article fills that gap. It explores how U.S.
and Minority Oppression in Close Corporations, 24 J. CORP. L. 913, 919
(1999).
14 For insights on equity compensation, see generally M ICHAEL B.
DORFF, INDISPENSABLE AND OTHER MYTHS: WHY THE CEO PAY EXPERIMENT
FAILED AND HOW TO FIX IT (2014) (questioning the theoretical foundation for
incentive pay and advocating for salary-based executive pay); ALAN HYDE,
WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A HIGHVELOCITY LABOR MARKET (2003) (providing a comprehensive overview of the
Silicon Valley labor market and compensation practices); Robert Anderson
IV, Employee Incentives and the Federal Securities Laws, 57 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1195, 1217–52 (2003) (discussing the status of employee options as
securities); Matthew T. Bodie, Aligning Incentives with Equity: Employee
Stock Options and Rule 10b-5, 88 IOWA L. REV. 539 (2003) (focusing on the
availability of Rule 10b-5 actions); Thomas A. Smith, The Zynga Clawback:
Shoring Up the Central Pillar of Innovation, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 577,
589–606 (2013) (focusing on the law and economics of equity compensation
as private ordering); Yifat Aran, Note, Beyond Covenants Not to Compete:
Equilibrium in High-Tech Startup Labor Markets, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1235,
1235 (2018) (discussing California’s public policy against noncompete
enforcement and the new employee stock options market and noting that
“employees at less successful firms can move to competitors at little or no
cost, but valuable employees of successful private firms are, practically,
handcuffed just as if they were subject to a powerful noncompete.”); Michael
C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How Much You Pay,
but How, HARV. BUS. REV., May–June 1990, at 138, 141 (advocating for
equity compensation as a form of incentive-based executive pay).
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technology companies engage in a “war for talent,” 15 a
phenomenon that will continue to define the industry’s
competitive landscape for years to come.16
This Article examines this Silicon Valley puzzle—is there
a shift in unicorn employee expectations that results in labor
contract renegotiations? The answer is yes: The challenges
that unicorn firms face as repeat players in competitive
technology markets and the consequences of failing to meet
their employees’ expectations have resulted in labor contract
renegotiations. However, current securities and tax laws
create legal barriers to private ordering, which prevent the
parties from solving these issues on their own.
The Article offers the following possible solutions. First, it
proposes new equity-based compensation contracts for
different types of employees (rank-and-file, managers, and
founders) than those typically entered into today. Second, it
explores alternatives to the traditional liquidity mechanism
and offers the shortcomings of these possible alternatives.
Third, it suggests new mandatory disclosure requirements,
proposals to removing the legal barriers to private ordering,
and the solutions provided, and complications created by,
these suggested regulatory changes.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) is also
concerned with these challenges. In fact, the agency is
exploring new rules that would make it easier for unicorns

15 “The term ‘war on talent’ was coined by McKinsey’s Steven Hankin
in 1997 and popularized by the book of that name in 2001.” Scott Keller &
Mary Meaney, Attracting and Retaining the Right Talent, MCKINSEY & CO.
(Nov. 2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/organization/
our-insights/attracting-and-retaining-the-right-talent
[https://perma.cc/
G4C5-293G]; see also Shira Ovide, Opinion, Honey, I Shrunk Apple’s Profit
Margins, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/
view/articles/2018-08-02/apple-aapl-at-1-trillion-honey-i-shrunk-the-profitmargins (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review) (“U.S. technology
titans are in an arms race[.]“).
16 See Elizabeth G. Chambers, Mark Foulon, Helen Handfield-Jones,
Steven M. Hankin & Edward G. Michaels III, The War for Talent, MCKINSEY
Q., 1998 Number 3, at 44, 46; see also Ovide, supra note 15.
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“to compensate their workers by giving them stock in the
company.”17
Traditional employee equity contracts were not designed to
prevent the heretofore unforeseen contingency of startups
remaining private for significantly longer. This delayed
timeline pre-IPO affects employee equity contracts and can
trigger conflicts between employees and employers.
Specifically, the major unicorn common shareholders
(typically the founders)18 have greater power vis-à-vis
preferred shareholders and minority common shareholders to
prevent a sale and keep the company private longer.19
According to incomplete contracting theory,20 this conflict,
which results from new market dynamics and changes to
unicorn startup governance arrangements, leads to
renegotiation of employee equity compensation agreements.
Equity compensation arrangements are customary in
California, because they can incentivize retention and
California labor law does not enforce non-compete clauses in

See Dave Michaels, SEC Chairman Wants to Let More Main Street
Investors in on Private Deals, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 30, 2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-chairman-wants-to-let-more-main-streetinvestors-in-on-private-deals-1535648208 (on file with the Columbia
Business Law Review).
18 See Michael Ewens & Joan Farre-Mensa, The Deregulation of the
Private Equity Markets and the Decline in IPOs 1 (Dec. 26, 2018)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3017610
[https://perma.cc/S859-WT5F] (“The IPO decline is . . . . the result of
founders taking advantage of their increased bargaining power and lower
cost of being private to realize their preference for control by choosing to
remain private.”).
19 See infra Part III.
20 See Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An Incomplete Contracts
Approach to Financial Contracting, 59 REV. ECON. STUD. 473, 474 (1992)
(explaining that sale of the firm can eliminate managers’ positions and their
private benefits); Brian Broughman & Jesse Fried, Renegotiation of Cash
Flow Rights in the Sale of VC-Backed Firms, 95 J. FIN. ECON. 384, 387 (2009)
(“[C]ommon shareholders thus might prefer keeping the firm independent
in the hope that it is later sold for a higher price or undergoes an IPO in
which the VCs are forced to convert to common[.]”).
17
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employment agreements. 21 Most unicorns are located in
Silicon Valley,22 and deal with employment contract
renegotiations because of the common use of incentive equity
compensation, such as stock options.23
In the past, many talented individuals chose to work for a
startup company for a below-market cash salary with a
substantial stock option grant, dreaming of cashing out for a
large sum of money after the startup’s IPO.24 Yet, today, due
to “lock-in” and illiquidity of unicorn shares, employees are
faced with a dilemma—if their stock options are expiring, they
must choose between forfeiting them (and consequently
forfeiting their chances of getting rich) or exercising them and
paying cash for shares that may turn out to be worth far less
than the exercise price.25 Because pre-IPO unicorn valuations
are very high, many employees find that their options are
prohibitively expensive due to liquidity constraints and tax
concerns. There is a heated debate in Silicon Valley about
whether the use of so-called “golden handcuffs,” the ninetyday stock option exercise period applicable to departing
employees, is fair or efficient due to these new market
conditions.26 At a minimum, golden handcuffs “lock in”
employees who may prefer to work for a younger startup with

21 See generally Richard A. Booth, Give Me Equity or Give Me Death –
The Role of Competition and Compensation in Silicon Valley, 1
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 265, 269 (2006); see also Aran, supra note 14,
at 1238.
22 For a list of states that have unicorn firms, see The United States of
Unicorns: Every US Company Worth $1B+ in One Map, CBINSIGHTS (July
25, 2017), https://www.cbinsights.com/research/startup-unicorns-us-map/
[https://perma.cc/3G5T-3D29].
23 In the past, renegotiations of labor contracts were driven mainly by
debt overhang, a debt burden so large that an entity cannot take on
additional debt to finance future projects, and incentivizing employees with
underwater options. See Broughman & Fried, supra note 20, at 385. Today,
as will be discussed infra, renegotiations are driven by the firm’s decision to
remain private longer and the illiquidity of its shares.
24 See infra Part II.
25 See infra Part II.
26 See infra Part II.
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more cutting-edge technology, and can thereby stifle
innovation necessary for a growing economy27
The shift in employee expectations is evident from public
employee complaints about their unicorn employers,28 which
not only causes reputational damage to employers29 but also
raises the cost of employee monitoring due to the increased
reputational risk. These complaints are available in public
reports from online data sites such as Glassdoor, showing
dissatisfaction among unicorn employees, especially about
extreme capital lock-in and stock illiquidity.30
In an effort to deal with these problems, various interest
groups, including the National Venture Capital Association,
have been successfully lobbying Congress for changes to tax
and securities laws.31 This Article will introduce the new
substantive legislative changes, including the Tax Cuts and
Jobs Act of 2017, which provides an extended deferral period
to certain employees.32 These changes are meant to deal with

27 See, e.g., Aran, supra note 14, at 1239–40 (“[T]he lock-in effect of
stock options might significantly impede the departure of much-needed
entrepreneurial talent from the most successful private firms.”).
28 Judith Samuelson, Why Do We Still Call It Capitalism?, QUARTZ
(Apr. 9, 2018), https://work.qz.com/1247835/spotifys-ipo-should-make-usconsider-why-we-still-use-the-term-capitalism/
[https://perma.cc/H5GK4H4D]. Unicorn employee complaints are not private anymore, as the
“conversation has moved to employee hangouts, both virtual and real, to
interview rooms on college campuses, and to public conversations about
Board diversity, the glass ceiling, and in the talent pool.” Id.
29 For more on agency costs and reputation, see Eugene F. Fama,
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 291–92
(1980).
30 These sites rank the “Best Companies to Work For,” and employees
pay “careful attention . . . to Employee Engagement Scores that link
corporate reputation, employee motivation, and productivity.” Samuelson,
supra note 28.
31 See infra notes 180–83 and accompanying text.
32 See Richard Lieberman, 2017 Tax Act Impact on Employee Benefits
and Executive Compensation, LEXIS PRAC. ADVISOR J. (Apr. 18, 2018),
https://www.lexisnexis.com/lexis-practice-advisor/thejournal/b/lpa/archive/2018/04/18/2017-tax-act-impact-on-employee-
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the problem of inefficient retention function of unicorn stock
option plans.
Uber Technologies, Inc. (“Uber”)33, the largest unicorn firm
in the United States by equity valuation, helps illustrate the
shift in employee expectations that has spurred
renegotiations and high employee turnover at unicorns. Uber
is currently dealing with high turnover rates of
knowledgeable employees, 34 despite generally offering a
competitive salary and the second-highest annual equity
award in the industry. 35 Software engineers at Uber are
better compensated than those working for Google,36
Microsoft,37 Amazon,38 and Apple.39 Uber continues to change
its equity compensation contracts, however, because of the
lock-in problem and illiquidity of its shares, and leads “the
benefits-and-executivecompensation.aspx [https://perma.cc/K6JP-FET7];
see also infra Section IV.A.2.
33 Uber is a privately held firm that was founded in 2009. See Alison
Griswold, Former Uber Employees Have Gone into Debt to Hang onto Shares
They Still Can’t Sell, QUARTZ (Dec. 10, 2017), https://qz.com/1149381/ubersoftbank-shares-debt/ [https://perma.cc/KP8W-LUJP]. From 2013 to 2016,
Uber’s valuation increased from $3.5 billion to approximately $70 billion.
Id.
34 This paper uses the term “employee” very broadly to include any
person who receives equity compensation, including rank and file staff and
senior management.
35 Uber pays a software engineer, on average, an annual equity
compensation of $157,000. See Efrati & Schultz, supra note 11. In
comparison, on average, Google pays $59,000, Microsoft pays $40,000, Apple
pays $39,000, and Amazon pays $33,000. See id.
36 Google pays a software engineer an average base salary of $132,000,
an average annual equity of $59,000, an average annual bonus of $22,000,
and an average signing bonus of $20,000 (total: $233,000). Id.
37 Microsoft pays an average base salary of $135,000, an average
annual equity of $40,000, an average annual bonus of $30,000, and an
average signing bonus of $17,000 (total: $222,000). Id.
38 Amazon pays an average base salary of $121,000, an average annual
equity of $33,000, an average annual bonus of $19,000, and an average
signing bonus of $30,000 (total: $203,000). Id.
39 Apple pays an average base salary of $127,000, an average annual
equity of $39,000, an average annual bonus of $20,000, and an average
signing bonus of $22,000 (total: $208,000). Id.
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race to the bottom, with 1.2 years [as] the average employee
tenure.”40
This Article explores the consequences of failing to meet
employee expectations and offers possible solutions. Part II
introduces the historical, economic, and legal evolution of
employee stock option plans, starting with the standard stock
option plan in Section II.A and the traditional governance
structures of VC-backed startups in Section II.B. Section II.C
describes the shift in employee expectations, which causes
labor contract renegotiations aimed at addressing the
problems of capital lock-in and illiquidity of unicorn stock.
Part III describes recent changes to U.S. capital markets,
including regulatory changes, such as the Jumpstart Our
Business Startups (“JOBS”) Act of 2012, which affect unicorn
firms’ ability to stay private for longer periods of time. Section
III.A provides an overview of the decline in IPOs. Section III.B
presents the new private market participants, mutual funds
and sovereign wealth funds, which invest large amounts of
capital in unicorn firms. Section III.C argues that changes to
the traditional startup financing model and to governance
structures of VC-backed firms has increased the founders’
ability to maintain control over the firm by preventing a sale,
especially when VC-investment rounds are structured as
“friendly” financing rounds.
Part IV discusses suggestions for dealing with the
challenges faced by unicorns, their investors, and their
employees and proposes possible solutions. Section IV.A
40 Uber is also dealing with organizational and corporate culture
problems, including leadership turnover and lawsuits over sexual
misconduct. See Biz Carson, Inside Uber’s Effort to Fix Its Culture Through
a
Harvard-Inspired
‘University’,
FORBES
(Feb.
3,
2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bizcarson/2018/02/03/inside-ubers-effort-tofix-its-culture-through-a-harvard-inspired-university/#7fcfbc5c1695
[https://perma.cc/M8G4-MQM5]. Airbnb, like Uber, is a unicorn with high
employee turnover and a short employee tenure of 1.64 years, but has not
dealt with these other problems. See Paysa Team, The Top Talent of Tech
Disruptors
and
Titans,
PAYSA
(July
10,
2017),
https://www.paysa.com/blog/the-top-talent-of-tech-disruptors-and-titans/
[https://perma.cc/AJC9-DZ5C]. There is also data on growth and number of
employees of unicorns. Id.
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presents contractual alternatives to the traditional stock
option plan (and employee contract) and addresses potential
pitfalls. Section IV.B describes alternatives to the traditional
liquidity mechanisms and their possible issues.
Part V proposes new recommendations that could operate
alongside these suggestions. Section V.A calls for protection of
unicorn employees. Section V.B presents recent regulatory
and legislative developments, including the Economic
Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act and
the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, and provides constructive criticism
of these developments. Urgent amendments and
comprehensive reform to the current regulatory and
legislative models are needed to remove legal barriers to
private ordering. This Part then proposes new disclosure
requirements to improve efficiency and reduce information
asymmetries.
Finally, Part VI concludes with a call for reform to the
current regulatory and legislative models, and recommends
providing unicorn employees with liquidity opportunities and
adequate disclosures that can improve efficiency and reduce
information asymmetries. By increasing equitable and more
sustainable employee participation in the operation of the
unicorn firm, these changes can improve the prospects for
unicorn companies.

II. EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTION PLANS
In the formation stages of a startup, founders “split the pie”
with employees and investors. As noted above, individuals
historically chose to work at high-risk startups for a modest
cash salary with significant stock option grants, in the hopes
that they could cash out for a large sum of money41 after an

41 See Ryan Decker, John Haltiwanger, Ron Jarmin & Javier Miranda,
The Role of Entrepreneurship in US Job Creation and Economic Dynamism,
28 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 4 (2014) (“[A] small fraction of young firms exhibit very
high growth and contribute substantially to job creation.”).
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IPO of the startup’s stock.42 Employee option grants made it
possible for employees to participate in the growth of the
business without having to put significant amounts of capital
at risk43 or to pay income tax that would ordinarily be due on
additional cash compensation. 44 This mechanism became
popular due to the recognition that employee equity-sharing
improves overall firm productivity, shareholder returns, and
profit levels.45
From the employer’s perspective, equity compensation
preserves cash, which is a precious commodity for most early
startup firms.46 Because a startup firm’s internal cash flow is
typically insufficient to support47 the firm’s expanding
42 See Joseph Blasi, Douglas Kruse & Richard Freeman, Having a
Stake: Evidence and Implications for Broad-Based Employee Stock
Ownership and Profit Sharing, THIRD WAY (Feb. 1, 2017),
https://www.thirdway.org/report/having-a-stake-evidence-andimplications-for-broad-based-employee-stock-ownership-and-profit-sharing
[perma.cc/B9T7-2V8K]; see also DOUGLAS L. KRUSE, RICHARD B. FREEMAN &
JOSEPH R. BLASI, SHARED CAPITALISM AT WORK: EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP,
PROFIT AND GAIN SHARING, AND BROAD-BASED STOCK OPTIONS 257–89 (2010).
43 In order to attract labor to Silicon Valley, startups used stock option
plans. See William Lazonick, The Financialization of the U.S. Corporation:
What Has Been Lost, and How It Can Be Regained, 36 SEATTLE U.L. REV.
857, 865 (2013); see also WILLIAM LAZONICK, SUSTAINABLE PROSPERITY IN THE
NEW ECONOMY? BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS AND HIGH-TECH EMPLOYMENT IN
THE UNITED STATES 51–56 (2009) (discussing Cisco as an example of a
company that attracted employees with stock options).
44 See Lazonick, supra note 43, at 874–75.
45 See Saul Levmore, Puzzling Stock Options and Compensation
Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1901 (2001) (“These options could take
many forms, but there is remarkable conformity in the practice of giving a
class of employees a large percentage of compensation (in expected value
terms) in the form of options[.]”); see also Smith, supra note 14 (discussing
at-will contracts and equity compensation).
46 See CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY & DIANE W. SAVAGE, MANAGERS AND THE
LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: STRATEGIES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 519 (2010).
47 See LARS OLA BENGTSSON, REPEATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN
VENTURE CAPITALISTS AND ENTREPRENEURS 3 (2006) (examining data on
1500 serial entrepreneurs and finding that a failed entrepreneur is twice as
likely to repeat VC relationships). Various studies show that approximately
eighty to ninety percent of entrepreneurial firms that are unable to get
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technology, research, and development needs, such firms
commonly raise capital to fund the acquisition and
development of essential intangible assets. 48
The financing of young startup firms presents challenges
to prospective investors and innovators. These challenges
result from information barriers that are associated with
investing in such firms. They result from uncertainty,49

venture capital backing fail within five to seven years of formation. See U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-00-190, SMALL BUSINESS: EFFORTS TO
FACILITATE EQUITY CAPITAL FORMATION 19 (2000) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]
(approximately eighty percent of new businesses fail or no longer exist
within five to seven years of formation).
48 If a startup cannot raise capital to support its growth, it will probably
have to go through a bankruptcy process. Bankruptcy is often the result of
a financing and information gap, which is termed in Silicon Valley the
“Valley of Death.” See Josh Lerner & Paul A. Gompers, The Money of
Invention: How Venture Capital Creates New Wealth, UBIQUITY (Jan. 2002),
http://ubiquity.acm.org/article.cfm?id=763904 [perma.cc/CX5Z-4A4V]; see
also PHILLIP E. AUERSWALD, LEWIS M. BRANSCOMB, NICHOLAS DEMOS &
BRIAN K. MIN, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., NIST GCR 02-841A,
UNDERSTANDING PRIVATE-SECTOR DECISION MAKING FOR EARLY-STAGE
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT 35–38 (2005), https://www.nist.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/2017/05/09/gcr02-841a.pdf [perma.cc/6LBZ-4UFX];
LEWIS M. BRANSCOMB & PHILLIP E. AUERSWALD, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS &
TECH., NIST GCR 02-841, BETWEEN INVENTION AND INNOVATION: AN
ANALYSIS OF FUNDING FOR EARLY-STAGE TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT 35–38
(2002),
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2017/05/09/
gcr02-841.pdf [perma.cc/NW5F-RRWJ]; George S. Ford, Thomas M.
Koutsky & Lawrence J. Spiwak, An Economic Investigation of the Valley of
Death in the Innovation Sequence 3–6 (Phoenix Ctr. for Advanced Legal &
Econ. Pub. Policy Studies, Discussion Paper, 2007), http://www.osec.doc.
gov/ReportValley%20of%20Death%20Funding%20Gap.pdf
[perma.cc/
K4BB-4LFU];. Additionally, the more outside capital needed, the greater
the dilution of the founders’ interests. See CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY & CRAIG E.
DAUCHY, THE ENTREPRENEUR’S GUIDE TO LAW AND STRATEGY (5th ed. 2018).
49 See PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 157
(2d ed. 2004) (discussing how entrepreneurs and budding companies, by
their very nature, are associated with considerable levels of uncertainty).
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information asymmetry,50 and agency problems,51 all of which
contribute to “adverse selection,” where investors have
difficulty screening and selecting entrepreneurs.52 Moreover,
the markets for allocating risk capital to startups are
inefficient,53 and until recently precluded non-VC investors
from backing such firms.54
This Article focuses on VC-backed startups in the United
States. Traditional VC investors, who invest in the first
significant round of financing, typically acquire up to forty to
sixty percent of a given startup, in the form of preferred stock
with specified rights and preferences.55 VCs also generally
require that startups reserve about ten to twenty percent of
equity for key hires and rank-and-file employees.56
VCs are sophisticated equity capital investors57 (so-called
“smart money”), and they almost always require tech company
50 See id. at 158; Laura Lindsey, Blurring Firm Boundaries: The Role
of Venture Capital in Strategic Alliances, 63 J. FIN. 1137, 1154 (2008).
51 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN.
ECON. 305, 309 (1976) (“The problem of inducing an ‘agent’ to behave as if
he were maximizing the ‘principal’s’ welfare is quite general.”).
52 See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970)
(discussing the “adverse selection” problem and focusing on the lemons
problem); see also Manuel A. Utset, Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic Behavior
& Venture Survival: A Theory of Venture Capital Financed Firms, 2002 WIS.
L. REV. 45, 56 (2002).
53 See Utset, supra note 52, at 54–56.
54 See BRANSCOMB & AUERSWALD, supra note 48, at 35–38.
55 See BAGLEY & SAVAGE, supra note 46, at 519; see also BAGLEY &
DAUCHY, supra note 48, at 79.
56 See BAGLEY & SAVAGE, supra note 46, at 519; see also BAGLEY &
DAUCHY, supra note 48, at 79.
57 VCs are “highly specialized financial intermediaries.” YINGLAN TAN,
THE WAY OF THE VC: HAVING TOP VENTURE CAPITALISTS ON YOUR BOARD 244
(2010). They offer “optimal services” to an entrepreneurial firm that is
positioned within the fund’s concentrated industry, which is usually very
narrowly defined. See Erica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Knowledge
Inputs, Legal Institutions and Firm Structure: Towards A Knowledge-Based
Theory of the Firm, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1123 (2007); see also Bengtsson,
supra note 47. Professional VC funds also face information asymmetry
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management to issue options to employees, both because they
incentivize the labor force to maximize their efforts and
because they mitigate the problems of asymmetric
information.58
Options help screen prospective employees to find those
who are committed and willing to tie their fate with that of
the company.59 The presumption is that the employees are
only willing to take that risk if they believe in the future
success of the business, which can contribute to the firm’s
growth.60
This Article next briefly describes the process of issuing
equity compensation to employees. It then discusses the
corporate governance structure of VC-backed startups,
explaining the pattern and purpose behind the widespread
use of preferred stock by VCs.

A. Standard Stock Option Plans
Employee stock options are very popular among growth
companies in the United States—so much so that most hightech startups, including Google, Intel, and Microsoft, use

issues. Accordingly, only ten percent of venture capitalists make their
expected rate of return. GAO REPORT, supra note 47, at 19; see also Amy E.
Knaup, Survival and Longevity in the Business Employment Dynamics
Data, MONTHLY LAB. REV., May 2005, 50, 51 (stating that thirty-four percent
of new businesses fail within their first two years and fifty-six percent fail
within four years).
58 See Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 57; see also JAMES V. DELONG,
COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST., THE STOCK OPTIONS CONTROVERSY AND THE NEW
ECONOMY 8 (2002), https://cei.org/sites/default/files/James%20DeLong%20%20The%20Stock%20Options%20Controversy%20And%20The%20New%2
0Economy.pdf [perma.cc/GY9Q-XJFT].
59 See DELONG, supra note 58, at 7–8.
60 See id. at 8 n.15 (“This point is different from the argument that stock
options keep individual incentives aligned with the corporate good. The
point here is that in the context of technical products and uncertainty, a
process that pre-selects employees for belief is a good thing for the
financiers.”); Edward P. Lazear, Output-Based Pay: Incentives or Sorting? 4
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7419, 1999),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w7419.pdf [perma.cc/Z4Z7-QZX6].
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equity compensation to build their companies.61 Stock option
plans are contracts between the company and its employees.
These contracts are designed to attract, engage, and retain
employees,62 by encouraging them to share in the ownership
of their firm (while the company preserves its cash).63
The idea that employees should share in the ownership of
their firm is not a new one, and indeed has a strong history in
American entrepreneurship.64 Tying a worker’s pay to
company performance can make the worker better off or worse
off, depending on the balance between risk and reward,
contractual design, and market conditions. During the 1990s,
the media publicized the success stories of Silicon Valley high
tech employees who were fortunate enough to become
millionaires overnight following a successful IPO. 65 By
contrast, during the early 2000s the media covered horror
stories about large public companies, such as Enron, that
engaged in rampant fraud and caused their employees to lose
most of their retirement savings, which was invested in
company stock or tied to company performance.66
Today, the media covers stories on employees who work for
unicorn firms and end up in debt when they take on loans to
exercise their stock options and pay any related taxes. 67
Moreover, as noted above, unicorn firms and VCs in Silicon
Valley are publicly debating whether the use of “golden
Blasi et al., supra note 42.
See Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 57, at 1185 (“Stock options are
a crucial tool for startups in the high-tech industry to retain knowledgeable
employees.”).
63 However, there is no consensus as to which of the designs achieves
these results. See BAGLEY & SAVAGE, supra note 46, at 519.
64 The United States has a long history of promoting broad-based
private property ownership. See Blasi et al., supra note 42.
65 High tech employees usually get stock options. See Blasi et al., supra
note 42; see also KRUSE ET AL., supra note 42, at 257–89.
66 Enron’s employee 401(k) plan was heavily invested in its stock. See
Blasi et al., supra note 42.
67 See, e.g., Matt Levine, Opinion, Work for Uber, Wind Up in Debt,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/201712-13/work-for-uber-wind-up-in-debt [perma.cc/5LQY-AKXP].
61
62
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handcuffs” is fair due to “lock-in” and illiquidity of unicorn
shares.68 The problem with using stock option contracts to
attract, engage and retain unicorn employees is that it is
difficult to create a liquid market for unicorn shares. Unicorns
are large privately held firms whose founders often do not
want to go public or be sold. As a result, traditional stock
option contracts may be ill-suited for employees at these
companies.

1. Standard Stock Option Process and Contract
Stock option plans are contracts between a company and
its employees (or its directors and advisors).69 The stock
option contract gives the optionee (the holder who is granted
the option), the right to buy a certain number of shares at a
strike price (or exercise price), which is typically fixed at fair
market value of the options at the time of grant.70 The option
may be exercised for the exercise period, which is a fixed
number of years, typically ten.71
The stock option contract is designed as a long-term
contract with a perpetual pipeline of unvested options to
prevent employees from leaving the company.72 The company
imposes vesting restrictions,73 which limit the employees’
ability to exercise the options for a stated period of time,
usually four years.74 The employees must be employed by the
company during this period. A common vesting schedule is

68
69

See infra Section III.C.
See Levmore, supra note 45, at 1901; see also Smith, supra note 14,

at 580.
See BAGLEY & SAVAGE, supra note 46, at 519.
See id.
72 See Lazonick, supra note 43, at 865 (“So that stock options would
perform a retention function as well as an attraction function, the practice
evolved in New Economy firms of making option grants annually, with the
vesting period for any annual block of option grants being 25% of the grants
at the end of each of the first four years after the grant date.”).
73 Id.
74 See BAGLEY & SAVAGE, supra note 46, at 519; see also Smith, supra
note 14, at 586.
70
71
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called “cliff vesting,” whereby one-fourth of the options vest at
the end of the first year, with the balance becoming
exercisable on a monthly basis, over the next three years.75
The option is valuable if the contract is designed for a long
period until expiration. 76 As long as the employee continued
to work for the company, she would typically have up to ten
years to exercise the options from the grant date.77 If,
however, the employee left the firm, the option agreement
would typically give the employee only ninety days to exercise
any vested options, a practice called “golden handcuffs.”78
Employees benefit from vested options if their company
goes public, as they are able to sell the stock and realize the
upside value that they helped create. 79 But today many
unicorn companies remain private, while their employees
must pay large sums of money out-of-pocket for the exercise

See infra Part III; see also Lazonick, supra note 43, at 865.
According to the Black-Scholes option pricing model, an option is
more valuable the longer the period until expiration. See Fischer Black &
Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL.
ECON. 637, 638 (1973).
77 See Lazonick, supra note 43, at 865. This practice derives from
Section 422(b) of the Internal Revenue Code, which provides that an
“incentive stock option” must not be “exercisable after the expiration of 10
years” from the grant date. I.R.C. § 422 (West 2017).
78 See, e.g., Connie Loizos, Handcuffed to Uber, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 29,
2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/04/29/handcuffed-to-uber/ [perma.cc/
WRW7-X48L].
79 See BAGLEY & SAVAGE, supra note 46, at 347.
75
76
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price and taxes80 on profit that may never materialize.81 As a
result, the value of equity options to employees is
diminished—helping to explain why unicorn firms are
experiencing difficulties with attracting, engaging and
retaining talent.82
In general, unicorn employees hope that the company will
go public and that the shares will be traded at a price higher
than the exercise price. In the event of a sale of the company,
employees can exercise the vested options prior to the sale.
After doing so, they will either be able to sell their shares or
their options will be canceled in exchange for a payment equal
to the spread between the exercise price and the sale price.83
80 Federal and state taxes are imposed on exercise of equity options,
even when there is no active market to sell them and such a market might
never materialize. See Lieberman, supra note 32; see also New Tax Act
Provides Tax Deferral Opportunity for Private Company Equity
Compensation Awards, DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP (Jan. 8, 2018)
[hereinafter New Tax Act], https://www.davispolk.com/files/2018-0108_tax_act_provides_deferral_opportunity_private_company_equity_comp
ensation_awards.pdf [perma.cc/378N-FK2V] (“This potential disconnect has
grown more prevalent in recent years as many tech companies have
deferred their initial public offerings, frustrating the ability of employees to
receive the benefit of equity awards without paying taxes out of pocket.”);
Kathleen Pender, Bills Would Ease Tax Burden of Private-Company Stock
Options, S.F. CHRON. (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.sfchronicle.
com/business/networth/article/Bills-would-ease-tax-burden-of-privatecompany-9157182.php [perma.cc/7GDT-JMTY]; Tax “Reform” and Its
Impact On Stock Compensation, MYSTOCKOPTIONS.COMBLOG (Dec. 20,
2017), http://mystockoptions.typepad.com/blog/2017/12/tax-reform-and-itsimpact-on-stock-compensation.html [perma.cc/2RSG-FFZ4].
81 This can also lead to a cash-flow issue for the unicorn firm. The firm
is required to withhold and remit income and employment taxes at the time
of the exercise (for NSOs) or vesting (for RSUs), but it is not transferring
any cash to the grantee from which it can withhold those amounts. See Scott
Belsky, Don’t Get Trampled: The Puzzle for “Unicorn” Employees, MEDIUM
(Jan. 2, 2017), https://medium.com/positiveslope/dont-get-trampled-thepuzzle-for-unicorn-employees-8f00f33c784f [perma.cc/76C3-E9CE]
82 See Andrew Ross Sorkin, How Valuable Is a Unicorn? Maybe Not as
Much as It Claims to Be, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2yvpuyk
[perma.cc/4Y7C-3KAA].
83 See Ilona Babenko, Fangfang Du & Yuri Tserlukevich, Will I Get
Paid? Employee Stock Options and Mergers and Acquisitions 1 (European
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2. ISOs vs. NSOs
There are two types of stock options, incentive stock
options (“ISOs”)84 and nonstatutory stock options (NSOs),85
which are treated differently for the purpose of federal income
tax. ISOs are granted only to employees. Employees can only
take advantage of the beneficial tax treatment afforded to
ISOs when certain requirements are met. First, the option’s
exercise price, or the price per share at which the option can
be purchased, cannot be less than the fair market value on the
date of the grant.86 Second, employees cannot transfer ISOs
to others, except on death. Third, the company’s board of
directors and shareholders must approve the written plan to
grant ISOs. Fourth, as noted above, the employee must
exercise the ISOs within the earlier of ten years from the
grant date or ninety days of termination of employment.87
Fifth, employees may not exercise more than a $100,000 value
of ISOs in any one calendar year, as determined at the time of
grant. Finally, there is a holding requirement: employees
must hold the shares for at least two years after the grant date
and one year after the exercise date.
If all the conditions are met, then the employee will not
have any tax consequences at the time of grant or when the
options are exercised.88 After a disposition (such as a sale) of
Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper No. 486/2016, 2017) (“In 79.9% of all
completed M&A deals, some of the target’s outstanding employee stock
options are terminated by the acquirer. . . . Further, employees are often
forced to accept the intrinsic value of their vested in-the-money stock
options in lieu of the Black-Scholes value[.]”)
84 ISOs are mainly used by private companies. See BAGLEY & SAVAGE,
supra note 46, at 521.
85 Id.
86 If the employee is a stockholder of ten percent or more in the
company, then the exercise price must be equal to one hundred ten percent
of the fair market value of the underlying security on the date of grant.
87 If the employee is a stockholder of ten percent or more in the
company, then it is five years from the date of grant. The ninety-day period
can be extended if the termination is due to disability or death.
88 NSOs do not have tax consequences at the time of grant (unless
options are granted below fair market value).
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the stock acquired upon exercise of the options, any gain or
loss is treated as a long-term capital gain or loss. The
employer has no withholding at exercise and no deduction.89
If the holding requirements are not met, then the disposition
is disqualified, and the ISOs are taxed as NSOs. Also, the
alternative minimum tax may be tax payable upon the
exercise of even ISOs.90
NSOs have fewer restrictions and are not limited to
employees.91 In practice, NSO plans are usually written with
a requirement that the exercise price cannot be less than the
fair market value on the date of the grant, because section
409A of the Internal Revenue Code regulates nonqualified
deferred compensation paid by a service recipient to a service
provider by generally imposing a twenty percent
excise tax when certain design or operational rules contained
in the section are violated.92 The NSOs holder will be taxed at
the time of exercise but not at the time of grant.93 The
difference between the value of the underlying security at the
time of exercise of the NSOs and the exercise price of the
NSOs is taxed as ordinary income.94 If the holder of the NSOs
is an employee, the taxable amount is subject to withholding
and employment taxes.95 After a sale, there are different tax
treatments of the gain or loss depending on the holding
period.96 If the underlying securities are held for one year or
less after exercise, then the income is taxed as a short-term

89 With NSOs, there is a deduction on the spread (the excess of the fair
market value of the stock at the date of exercise over the exercise period) at
exercise.
90 See BAGLEY & SAVAGE, supra note 46, at 521.
91 See I.R.C. § 409A (2012).
92 Id. Noncompliance with section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code
can result in adverse tax consequences to the holder of the NSOs (and the
company). See id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
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capital gain or loss. 97 If they are held for more than one year,
then the tax treatment is for long-term capital gains.98
As noted above, stock option plans were designed to retain
talent and prevent “leakage from firm knowledge resources to
other competitors.”99 According to Gorga and Halberstam,
startup firms wanted to avoid the high costs associated with
employee turnover and prevent the negative effect that high
employee turnover has on company morale.100
According to labor market analysis, when employees
receive specialized training they become very valuable to the
firm and turnover becomes very costly.101 Similarly
qualified—but inexperienced—replacements require costly
training to attain the proficiency of highly-trained employees.
Therefore, these contracts were designed as long-term
contracts to minimize departure.102

B. Traditional Governance Structure of VC-Backed
Startups
While startups preferred equity payment plans for
retention and cash-flow purposes, the favorable tax
treatments for ISOs and NSOs made them appealing to
employees as well. However, changes to the traditional
governance structure of VC-backed firms caused a shift in
employee expectation that created a labor contracting

Id.
Id.
99 Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 57, at 1125 (“[T]he adoption of stock
option plans in high-tech firms controls knowledge hazards[.]”).
100 Id.
101 See generally Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Tailored
Claims and Governance: The Fit Between Employees and Shareholders, in
EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe
eds., 1999); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious
Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PENN. L.
REV. 1619 (2001).
102 See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Michael L. Wachter & Jeffrey E.
Harris, Understanding the Employment Relation: The Analysis of
Idiosyncratic Exchange, 6 BELL J. ECON. 250 (1975).
97
98
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problem that will be discussed later.103 To understand these
changes, though, it is important to first review the traditional
governance structures of VC-backed startups.
Entrepreneurial high-growth and high-technology firms
(“startups”) are an important source of new experimentation
and ideas, which would otherwise remain untapped in the
economy.104 Young (both large and small) startups play an
important role in creating jobs, generating technological
innovation and stimulating the U.S. economy.105 However,
many venture capital firms are concerned about the unicorn
phenomenon and its adverse effect on the traditional startup
funding model.106

See infra Part III.C.
For a detailed explanation on how ideas promote growth, see
generally Charles I. Jones, Growth and Ideas, in 1B HANDBOOK OF
ECONOMIC GROWTH 1063 (Philippe Aghion & Steven N. Durlauf eds., 2005).
105 Empirical evidence tying startups to job creation began developing
in the late 1970s and continued to grow through the 1980s. See, e.g., David
L.
Birch,
Who
Creates
Jobs?,
65
PUB. INT. 3
(1981),
http://www.nationalaffairs.com/public_interest/detail/who-creates-jobs
[https://perma.cc/4SFS-H84X]; see also ZOLTAN J. ACS & DAVID B.
AUDRETSCH, INNOVATION AND SMALL FIRMS (1990) (establishing the greater
weight of small firms in contributing to the U.S. economy and in generating
technological innovations relative to large firms); ROBERT JAY DILGER,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41523, SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION AND JOB
CREATION
(2018),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41523.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V4A5-MZ68]; Zoltan J. Acs & David B. Audretsch,
Innovation in Large and Small Firms: An Empirical Analysis, 78 AM. ECON.
REV. 678 (1988). Entrepreneurship is considered to be an important
mechanism for economic development through employment, innovation
and welfare effects. See generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL , THE FREE-MARKET
INNOVATION MACHINE (2002); JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1934); Acs & Audretsch, supra; Sander
Wennekers & Roy Thurik, Linking Entrepreneurship and Economic
Growth, 13 S MALL BUS. ECON. 27 (1999).
106 See PITCHBOOK, supra note 9, at 3 (“Many venerable VCs view the
unicorn phenomenon with scorn, operating under the assumption that
billion-dollar valuations are a distraction—and potentially a detriment—to
the traditional startup funding model.”).
103
104

134

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2019

1. Traditional Pattern of VC Preferred Stock
The typical U.S. VC-backed start-up has two classes of
stock: common and preferred, which can include multiple
series. Startups usually issue preferred stock to VCs107 and do
so after each new round of financing.108 In contrast, founders,
employees, angels, and other early investors receive common
stock.109
Preferred stock grants its holders priority over common
stock in the event of sale or liquidation and in the payment of
dividends.110 If the firm is sold or dissolves, then the VCs will
receive an amount equal to their liquidation preference before
the common shareholders (the founders, employees, and angel
investors) receive anything.111 This is one of the reasons for

107 VCs traditionally invest in startups using convertible preferred
stock. See Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Financial Contracting
Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital
Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 281 (2003); see also William A. Sahlman,
The Structure and Governance of Venture Capital Organizations, 27 J. FIN.
ECON. 473 (1990).
108 See Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist
Control in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 981–82 (2006).
109 See id. at 981.
110 For more on the exit strategy of VCs, see D. Gordon Smith, The Exit
Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV. 315, 316 (2005) (“Before
venture capitalists invest, they plan for exit.”). For helpful background on
the distinction between cash-flow and control rights, see generally Zohar
Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law
and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 784–85 (2017); see also William
W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A Theory of Preferred Stock, 161 U. PA.
L. REV. 1815, 1875 (2013) (“Venture capitalists holding preferred sometimes
take voting control and can dominate the boards of directors even when
holding a minority of the votes.”); Fried & Ganor, supra note 108, at 981;
Utset, supra note 52, at 61 (“Venture capitalists in most instances negotiate
to get outright control of the board.”).
111 Sometimes in a subsequent round of financing, liquidation
preferences from early rounds are waived or reduced, “to eliminate debt
overhang.” Broughman & Fried, supra note 20, at 391 n.6. Alternatively, a
VC can be forced to convert to common and give up its preferences, if there
is a pay-to-play contractual provision and it fails to participate. See id. at
391 n.6.
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recent controversial lawsuits; common stock holders, such as
mutual funds, sue for breach of fiduciary duty after they do
not get anything from the sale of the company. 112
If the firm conducts an IPO113 (or is sold for a very high
price), then the amount a VC could receive as a common
stockholder may exceed its liquidation preference. In this
case, a VC will convert its preferred stock to common at a predefined ratio.114 As noted, most employees dream of an IPO,
but the most common form of VC exit is a sale. 115
In order to gain from their investment and provide
liquidity for the investors in their fund, VCs will look for a
112 See, e.g., In re Trados Inc. S’holder. Litig., 73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013)
(involving claims against the board of a startup that was sold in a merger
transaction). For an example of a subsequent court attempting to interpret
Trados’s holding on the mechanics of fairness review, see In re Nine
Systems Corp. S’holders. Litig., Consol. C.A. No. 3940-VCN, 2014 WL
4383127 (Del. Ch. 2014); see also Bratton & Wachter, supra note 110;
Abraham J.B. Cable, Opportunity-Cost Conflicts in Corporate Law, 66 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 51, 75–76 (2015); Adam M. Katz, Comment, Addressing the
Harm to Common Stockholders in Trados and Nine Systems, 118 COLUM. L.
REV. ONLINE 234 (2018).
113 Many have written on VCs exit at IPO. See, e.g., Christopher B.
Barry, Chris J. Muscarella, John W. Peavy III & Michael R. Vetsuypens,
The Role of Venture Capital in the Creation of Public Companies: Evidence
from the Going-Public Process, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 447 (1990); Paul A.
Gompers, Grandstanding in the Venture Capital Industry, 42 J. FIN. ECON.
133 (1996); Peggy M. Lee & Sunil Wahal, Grandstanding, Certification, and
the Underpricing of Venture Capital Backed IPOs, 73 J. FIN. ECON. 375
(2004); William L. Megginson & Kathleen A. Weiss, Venture Capitalist
Certification in Initial Public Offerings, 46 J. FIN. 879 (1991).
114 See Broughman & Fried, supra note 20 (contributed to the literature
on VC exit via private sale and found that renegotiation is more likely when
governance arrangements, including the firm’s choice of corporate law, give
common shareholders the power to impede the sale); Thomas Hellmann,
IPOs, Acquisitions and the Use of Convertible Securities in Venture Capital,
81 J. FIN. ECON. 649 (2006).
115 See Broughman & Fried, supra note 20, at 385 (noting that the most
common VC exit is private sale). Broughman and Fried suggest that, “when
exiting through a sale, VCs generally have sufficient control to realize their
full cash flow rights. However, VCs sometimes need to pay common
shareholders to obtain their support for the proposed sale, and the
likelihood of such renegotiation is higher when VCs have less control.” Id.

136

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2019

quick exit. VCs have a bias towards early liquidity events,
even if “the expected value of remaining an independent
private company is higher.”116
The preferred stock is therefore used as a signaling tool to
VCs that the entrepreneur believes in the worth of the
startup.117 By demanding preferred stock, the VCs make sure
that the entrepreneur will not profit from the startup until the
proceeds from an IPO or sale are greater than the VC’s
liquidation preference.118
Therefore, the typical start-up lifecycle pattern proceeds as
follows. The founders, backed by early equity capital
providers, hire employees (the factors of production)119 and
offer them equity incentives. Employees who are willing to
take a risk with the start-up accept a lower salary and a
substantial stock option grant (or other equity incentive
plan).120 Finally, VC investors will look for an exit
opportunity. As noted, there are three exit possibilities.
First, the board of directors (usually controlled by the VCs)
can choose to go public through an IPO.121 Following the IPO,
116 See Fried & Ganor, supra note 108, at 994; see also id. at 995
(“Liquidity events promise a certain payout, much of which the preferred
shareholders can capture through their liquidation preferences. Continuing
to operate the firm as an independent company may expose the preferredowning VCs to risk without sufficient opportunity for gain.”).
117 See id. at 994–95.
118 See id. at 983 (“If the firm does poorly, the founder will therefore get
less than her pro rata share of the firm’s value, and nothing at all if the
firm’s value is less than the liquidation preference. If the firm does well, and
the VCs convert into common, the founder receives her pro rata share of the
firm’s value. Thus, founders may have a greater incentive to increase
startup value than they would under an all-common capital structure.”).
119 See generally Daniel M. Cable & Scott Shane, A Prisoner’s Dilemma
Approach to Entrepreneur-Venture Capitalist Relationships, 22 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 142 (1997); D. Gordon Smith, Team Production in Venture
Capital Investing, 24 J. CORP. L. 949, 960 (1999).
120 See Smith, supra note 14, at 595.
121 For a discussion on the motives to go public, see Richard A. Booth,
The Limited Liability Company and the Search for a Bright Line Between
Corporations and Partnerships, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 79, 89–92 (1997);
see also James C. Brau & Stanley E. Fawcett, Initial Public Offerings: An
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the founders are often replaced with professional managers,
and the VC-controlled board is replaced with independent
directors. The capital providers and employees are able to
liquidate their investments in the firm.
Second, the board can decide to sell to another firm. In that
case, the capital providers are able to cash out according to
their preference, but the common shareholders, such as
employees, often do not receive much of the profit from the
sale, depending on the sale price. Indeed, their unexercised
options may be cancelled without receiving anything in
return, even for in-the-money options.122
Third, the start-up can be liquidated. As with a sale, VCs
are able to cash out according to their liquidation preference,
but again, the common shareholders, such as employees, are
unlikely to receive much of the liquidation proceeds.

2. Mitigation of Asymmetric Information and
Agency Costs
Venture capital firms are also able to use their preferred
stock to mitigate agency costs and information asymmetry. In
any startup, there is uncertainty concerning the success of the
startup firm’s product or service.123 In turn, this affects the
motivation of investors to advance capital and of suppliers to
extend credit.
Startup firms traditionally experience difficulty raising
capital from investors due to the uncertainty of success and
Analysis of Theory and Practice, 61 J. FIN. 399 (2006) (discussing a survey
on decisions to do an IPO).
122 See supra note 121.
123 See Anat Alon-Beck, The Law of Social Entrepreneurship—Creating
Shared Value Through the Lens of Sandra Day O’Connor’s iCivics 20 U. PA.
J. BUS. L. 520, 536 (2018). (“[The] information asymmetry and uncertainty
associated with agency issues contribute to ‘adverse selection,’ where
impact investors have difficulty screening and selecting credible, highquality entrepreneurs and companies, inhibiting investors’ ability to make
sound and competent investment decisions.”). According to Jensen and
Meckling’s “agency theory,” there is always uncertainty surrounding the
agent’s (or entrepreneur’s) possible mismanagement and opportunistic
conduct. See generally Jensen & Meckling, supra note 51.
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the asymmetric information problem. As outsiders,
prospective investors do not have the same knowledge about
a firm’s outlook as the entrepreneurs who work within the
firm and are responsible for decision-making.
Investment in entrepreneurial firms is an investment in
intangible assets, such as ideas, talents or trade secrets.124 It
is very hard to value the intangible assets involved. Further,
in the event of default, intangible assets are worthless to
investors.125 Stock options are used as a signaling tool to the
investors and outside market to help mitigate the information
asymmetry problem. To reduce moral hazard employees and
managers are given certain percentages in the company in the
form of stock options, as part of their compensation package.

C. The Shift in Employee Expectations & Labor
Contract Renegotiation
United States tech companies are engaged in a war for
talent,126 and unicorn firms in particular experience difficulty
with attracting, engaging, and retaining talent.127 The shift in
employee expectations is evident from the frequent reissue or
revision of equity grants and unicorn management’s
experimentation with alternative organizational strategies to
try to provide liquidity opportunities to employees and early
investors. As noted, due to these changes, unicorn employees
now realize that although they are “rich on paper,” they
cannot liquidate and reap the benefits of their hard work. 128
To illustrate, Uber,129 the largest unicorn firm in the
United States, has one of the highest turnover rates of
See Alon-Beck, supra note 123, at 536–37.
See Lindsey, supra note 50, at 1137; see also GOMPERS & LERNER,
supra note 49, at 128 (discussing the nature of the entrepreneur’s asset,
which affect her firm’s financial and corporate strategy).
126 See Elizabeth G. Chambers et al., supra note 16, at 46; see also
Ovide, supra note 15.
127 See Efrati & Schultz, supra note 11.
128 See infra Section III.C.
129 Employees who joined Uber at its founding in 2009 are probably
locked in due to its over-valuation. Though rich on paper, they cannot
124
125
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knowledgeable employees130 despite offering its talent, on
average, the highest annual salary, including the highest
equity award, among tech companies. 131 Software engineers
at Uber are, on average, better compensated than those at
Google,132 Microsoft,133 Amazon.com134 and Apple.135 Uber is
not the only unicorn that experiences high turnover, but is
leading “the race to the bottom, with 1.2 years of average
employee tenure.”136
Thanks to online data sites, such as Glassdoor and PaySa,
as well as news sites like CNBC, there are many public
reports about the fact that unicorn employees, especially Uber
employees, complain about the extreme capital lock-in and
illiquidity of their stock options.137 On March 6, 2017, the
Financial Times reported that Uber competitors have seen “an
liquidate. Additionally, if they joined in 2009, now, in 2019, their options
will soon expire under the Tax Code, and the company cannot extend them.
See generally supra notes 33–40.
130 According to The Information’s Average Software Engineer
Compensation chart, Airbnb pays an average annual equity compensation
of $158,000, and Uber pays an average annual equity compensation of
$157,000. Efrati & Schultz, supra note 11.
131 According to The Information’s Average Software Engineer
Compensation chart, Uber pays a software engineer, on average, an annual
equity compensation of $157,000. In comparison, on average, Google pays
$59,000, Microsoft pays $40,000, Amazon pays $33,000, and Apple pays
$39,000. Id.
132 Google pays a software engineer an average base salary of $132,000,
an average annual equity compensation of $59,000, an average annual
bonus of $22,000, and an average signing bonus of $20,000 (total: $233,000).
Id.
133 Microsoft pays an average base salary of $135,000, an average
annual equity compensation of $40,000, an average annual bonus of
$30,000, and an average signing bonus of $17,000 (total: $222,000). Id.
134 Amazon pays an average base salary of $121,000, an average annual
equity compensation of $33,000, an average annual bonus of $19,000, and
an average signing bonus of $30,000 (total: $203,000). Id.
135 Apple pays an average base salary of $127,000, an average annual
equity compensation of $39,000, an average annual bonus of $20,000, and
an average signing bonus of $22,000 total: $208,000). Id.
136 Paysa Team, supra note 40; see also Efrati & Schultz, supra note 11.
137 See Samuelson, supra note 28.
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uptick in job applications from Uber employees, as its workers
lose faith in the company’s leadership and start to doubt the
value of their stock options.” 138 Uber is the largest technology
firm in Silicon Valley139 and historically, like many other
California firms, has been able to retain its employees by
offering them equity and stock options, thereby binding them
with golden handcuffs.140
Unicorn firms are no longer as rare and are growing at a
rapid pace around the world. The United States has the
largest concentration of unicorns in the world141 and around
“$700 billion in unrealized value is currently locked up in
unicorns.”142 In 2017 alone, “22% of the capital invested in the
US was part of a deal valuing a company at $1 billion or
more.”143

Leslie Hook, Uber Employees Lose Faith and Explore Exit, FIN.
TIMES (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/c6bc4b2c-0012-11e7-8d8ea5e3738f9ae4 [https://perma.cc/3TCW-RE3M].
139 See supra note 33.
140 Merriam Webster defines “golden handcuffs” as “special benefits
offered to an employee as an inducement to continue service,” with the first
known use by 1976. Golden Handcuffs, MERRIAM WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/golden%20handcuffs
[https://perma.cc/69NF-L595]; see also Booth, supra note 21, at 271. For
further accounts of Uber’s use of golden handcuffs, see Dan Primack, Uber
Plays Hardball with Early Shareholders, FORTUNE (June 20, 2014),
http://fortune.com/2014/06/20/uber-plays-hardball-with-earlyshareholders/ [https://perma.cc/7S5C-TYGE]; Dan Primack, Early ‘Unicorn’
Employees Can’t Always Cash In, FORTUNE (Aug. 19, 2014),
http://fortune.com/2014/08/19/early-unicorn-employees-cant-always-cashin/ [https://perma.cc/4XPU-SWRE].
141 See PITCHBOOK, supra note 9 (“The aggregate valuation of unicorns
stood at just $35 billion in 2009, but has grown more than 20x since.”). For
the latest list of unicorn companies, see The Global Unicorn Club, CB
INSIGHTS,
https://www.cbinsights.com/research-unicorn-companies
[https://perma.cc/RL7L-W9RL].
142 PITCHBOOK, supra note 9.
143 Id.
138
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These firms are growing “twice as fast as those founded a
decade ago.”144 Due to this fast-paced growth, founders and
managers of unicorn firms are dealing with critical problems
of getting big fast.145 One such problem associated with
expanding from a small startup team to a large unicorn with
thousands of employees is the fight to recruit, engage, and
retain a motivated work force.146 However, the unicorn firm’s
and its employees’ short-term economic interests are in clear
conflict.
First, unicorn employees now experience capital or
“investor” lock-in.147 Capital lock-in refers to when equity
investors in a corporation are not able to withdraw or
“redeem” the capital that they contributed.148 They cannot
force the corporation to distribute assets or buy back their
shares.149

144 How Unicorns Grow, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2016, at 28, 28
(“Firms founded from 2012 to 2015 had a time to market cap more than
twice that of firms founded from 2000 to 2003.”).
145 See
Zach Cutler, 4 Big Challenges That Startups Face,
ENTREPRENEUR
(Dec.
11,
2014),
https://www.entrepreneur.com/
article/240742 [https://perma.cc/UZ83-2LYU]. See generally Wickham
Skinner, Big Hat, No Cattle: Managing Human Resources, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Sept.–Oct. 1981, at 106.
146 Until employees exercise their options, they cannot vote on how the
firm will operate, and many times, even after they exercise, their voting
rights are marginal. Therefore, due to the large size of unicorn startups,
stock-holding employees have no control over the company’s strategy or
senior managements’ actions.
147 See Darian M. Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65 VAND.
L. REV. 1, 7 (2012) (introducing the term “investor lock-in”). This lock-in
effect is due to the fact that founders, senior management, and some
investors are not in a rush to do an IPO. See Kupor, supra note 3, on the
decline in IPOs.
148 See Ibrahim, supra note 147, at 6–7; see also Margaret M. Blair,
Reforming Corporate Governance: What History Can Teach Us, 1 BERKELEY
BUS. L.J. 1, 26 (2004).
149 See Ibrahim, supra note 147, at 6; see also Blair, supra note 148, at
14, 26 (citing early corporate charters and statutes that limited withdrawals
to formal corporate dissolution).
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Corporate law scholars have debated the desirability of
this capital lock-in. Some scholars, such as Margaret Blair,
maintain that capital lock-in is desirable because it assures
firm stability, as investors do not have the power to withdraw
their capital easily. 150 In contrast, scholars including Larry
Ribstein and Darian Ibrahim maintain that capital lock-in
raises agency costs, as investors do not have a way of
disciplining the firm’s managers by threatening to withdraw
their capital from the firm,151 which further contributes to
governance problems within the firm.
Unicorn employees become common shareholders when
they exercise their options. As common shareholders, they do
not have downside protection. Therefore, their common shares
will be last in line to be paid, even if there is a sale in the
future.152 The experience of Good Technology (“Good”)
employee compensation illustrates the problems that arise
when this lack of downside protection is combined with the
lock-in issues described above.153
Good was a unicorn startup that filed for an IPO in May
2014 but eventually postponed it and never completed the
process.154 In March 2015, Good’s board of directors declined
an acquisition offer for $825 million due to their desire to go
public.155 After running into financial distress, Good
150 See Blair, supra note 148, at 43. According to Blair, capital lock-in
allows the firm to attract not only investors but also “skilled employees[.]”
Id.
151 See Larry E. Ribstein, Should History Lock in Lock-in?, 41 TULSA L.
REV. 523, 524–25 (2006); see also Ibrahim, supra note 147, at 6–7.
152 A sale of a startup is more likely to happen today than an IPO. See
3 Data Points that Suggest the IPO Market May Never Come Back, CB
INSIGHTS (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.cbinsights.com/research/tech-ipo-dead/
[https://perma.cc/3BM3-JVJ9] (“Despite regular yearnings for an IPO
comeback, it might be time to accept that it’s not going to happen.”).
153 See Cable, supra note 5, at 614–16.
154 See Matt Levine, Opinion, Good Technology Wasn’t So Good for
Employees, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 23, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/
opinion/articles/2015-12-23/good-technology-wasn-t-so-good-for-employees
(on file with the Columbia Business Law Review).
155 See id.
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ultimately sold for almost half this value, $425 million, in
September 2015.156 News of the sale came as a shock to Good’s
employees, who “discovered their Good stock was valued at 44
cents a share, down from $4.32 a year earlier.”157
Good’s preferred shareholders were able to recover their
investment. However, Good’s employees, who were common
shareholders, “ended up paying to work” for Good.158 Some
employees had taken on loans to pay for the taxes to exercise
their stock options, but never profited from that investment
as the loan amounts were much larger than what their stock
was worth after the sale.
It should be noted that, prior to the sale, Good allowed its
employees to trade their stock on the secondary markets.
Some of Good’s employees did not use the secondary market
as an exit vehicle, but instead purchased additional Good
stock on these platforms as they believed in the company’s
success and in the board’s desire to follow-through with an
IPO. Good exhibits the risks caused by information
asymmetry: employee-investors not only took on loans to
exercise their options, but even bought additional shares on
the secondary market because they believed in the company
and had no idea about its financial distress.
This example illustrates how important IPOs are as an exit
tool for unicorn employees. IPOs allow employees to start a
new firm or join a new startup and relax the employees’
financial constraints.159 Unfortunately, as explained in Part
III, there has been a steady decline in IPOs.

See id.
Id.
158 Id.
159 See Tania Babina, Paige Ouimet & Rebecca Zarutskie, Going
Entrepreneurial? IPOs and New Firm Creation (Div. of Research &
Statistics and Monetary Affairs, Fed. Reserve Bd., Financial & Economic
Discussion Series, No. 2017-022, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2940133
[https://perma.cc/AB6R-DMH8]. Babina et al.’s results suggest a new
potential cost of IPOs that firms should factor into their IPO decision: losing
entrepreneurial-minded employees.
156
157
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III. PRIVATE MARKETS ARE THE NEW PUBLIC
MARKETS
A variety of market conditions contribute to the rise in
unicorn firms, which no longer follow the traditional
trajectory of a high growth startup or grow as “incubators for
tomorrow’s publicly held corporations.”160 The corporate
patterns and theories observed today are not merely products
and consequences of technology or development narratives,
but lie in politics and economic philosophy as well.161
Section III.A explains the decline of the U.S. public
corporation and public markets and Section III.B presents
some changes to legislation that facilitate the raising of
private capital.

A. Decline in IPOs
Recently, there has been a sharp decline in IPOs in the
United States, which makes “our public capital markets . . .
less attractive to growing businesses than in the past,”
according to Jay Clayton, Chairman of the SEC.162
Policymakers, regulators, investors, academics 163 and the
Rock & Wachter, supra note 13, at 914.
An examination of classic corporate governance theory
demonstrates that “the public corporation is as much a political adaptation
as an economic or technological necessity.” Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory
of American Corporation Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10, 10 (1991).
162 Jay Clayton, Testimony on “Oversight of the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission,” SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Sept. 26, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/testimony-clayton-2017-09-26#_ftn1
[https://perma.cc/6JDX-U9TK ]
163 There are many theories that try to explain the decline in IPOs. See
generally Francesco Bova, Miguel Minutti-Meza, Gordon Richardson &
Dushyantkumar Vyas, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Exit Strategies of
Private Firms, 31 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 818 (2014); see also Renee M. Jones,
Essay, The Unicorn Governance Trap, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 165, 170
(2017) (showing that new regulations caused a corporate governance
problem, by creating unicorns that are not subject to the oversight of the
market or supervised by regular private company investors). Bova and
others claim that the expense of regulatory compliance with the 2002
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) is a factor in the decline of IPOs. See Sarbanes
160
161
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press are concerned about the present decline.164 To illustrate
this decline, during the dot-com peak in 1996, more than 8000
domestic public companies were listed on a U.S. stock
exchange.165 The number was down to 3618 companies by the
end of 2016.166
In the United States, the volume of IPOs is a measure of
success of the innovation economy.167 Innovation has a very
Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). Compliance with
the SOX requirements shifted the incentive for private firms. The new exit
strategy of private firms is to be acquired by a public acquirer, as opposed
to doing an IPO. See Bova et al., supra. On the other hand, the following
scholars argue that SOX and other early-2000s regulatory changes are not
the cause for the decline in small firm IPOs. See Doidge et al., The U.S. Left
Behind, supra note 6, at 569; Doidge et al., The U.S. Listing Gap, supra note
6, at 486; Gao et al., supra note 6, at 1690; Paul Rose & Steven Davidoff
Solomon, Where Have All the IPOs Gone? The Hard Life of the Small IPO, 6
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 83, 86–87 (2016).
164 See Frank Partnoy, The Death of the IPO, ATLANTIC (Nov. 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/11/privateinequity/570808/ [https://perma.cc/BSY7-6N7M]; Steven Davidoff Solomon,
A Dearth of I.P.O.s, but It’s Not the Fault of Red Tape, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/28/business/dealbook/fewer-iposregulation-stock-market.html [https://perma.cc/ABD6-FGCR].
165 See DAVID BROWN, JEFF GRABOW, CHRIS HOLMES & JACKIE KELLEY,
ERNST & YOUNG LLP, LOOKING BEHIND THE DECLINING NUMBER OF PUBLIC
COMPANIES: AN ANALYSIS OF TRENDS IN THE US CAPITAL MARKETS 2 (2017)
[hereinafter EY REPORT], https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ananalysis-of-trends-in-the-us-capital-markets/$FILE/ey-an-analysis-oftrends-in-the-us-capital-markets.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NF7-MDF6] (“US
listings hit a record high of more than 8,000 domestically incorporated
companies listed on a US stock exchange with an average market
capitalization of $1.8b in today’s dollars”).
166 Doidge et al., Eclipse of the Public Corporation, supra note 6, at 8.
This number decreased quickly through 2003, to 5295 domestic U.S.-listed
companies. EY REPORT, supra note 165, at 2 (“The loss of domestic US-listed
companies in 1996–2003 represents 74% of the loss from 1996 to date.”).
167 Shai Bernstein, Innovator’s Dilemma: IPO or No?, THIRD WAY.ORG
(Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.thirdway.org/report/innovators-dilemma-ipoor-no (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review); see also ANDREW
METRICK & AYAKO YASUDA, VENTURE CAPITAL & THE FINANCE OF INNOVATION
(2d ed. 2011); Craig Doidge et al., Eclipse of the Public Corporation, supra
note 6; Xiaohui Gao, et al., supra note 6; Manju Puri & Rebecca Zarutskie,
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important role in promoting growth, according to Solow’s
economic growth theory.168 Solow postulated that
technological innovation is the only reliable engine that can
drive change and is the fundamental source of sustained
productivity and growth.169 Until recently, an IPO exit was
believed to be the ultimate entrepreneur founder’s dream and
one of the greatest achievements in the lifecycle of a startup
company. What changed?
During the IPO process the startup company transforms
from a privately held corporation to one that is publicly traded
on an exchange with dispersed ownership. This
transformation allows a startup company to raise large
amounts of capital from the public markets. A company’s
transition to public equity markets also may affect its ability
to attract human capital. 170 After an IPO, the company will
gain improved access to capital, and the use of stock options
may enable firms to attract new human capital. 171
As noted above, startup firms typically experience
informational and financial barriers to raising capital. 172 This
is especially true following a financial crisis. Such difficulties
are the product of uncertainty, high risk, and information
asymmetry problems, and in the past precluded non-VC
investors from backing such firms.173 Therefore, academic

On the Life Cycle Dynamics of Venture-Capital-and Non-Venture-CapitalFinanced Firms, 67 J. FIN. 2247 (2012); Brian J. Broughman & Jesse M.
Fried, Do Founders Control Start-Up Firms That Go Public? 3 (European
Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper, No. 405/2018, 2018).
168 See Robert M. Solow, Growth Theory and After, 78 AM. ECON. REV.
307, 309 (1988).
169 See id.
170 See, e.g., Shai Bernstein, Does Going Public Affect Innovation?, 70 J.
FIN. 1365, 1398 (2015).
171 However, retention of key employees (inventors) may become
difficult as options are vested, ownership is diluted, and changes in firm
governance affect employees. See id.
172 See supra Section II.B.2.
173 See BRANSCOMB & AUERSWALD, supra note 48, at 14–16.
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literature has focused on VCs as an important source of
financing startups over the last thirty years.174
Recently, however, there has been a dramatic increase in
alternative financing vehicles, and new market trends have
developed in conjunction with, and sometimes in response to,
the difficulty of obtaining VC investments. New market
participants such as mutual funds and sovereign wealth funds
now invest large amounts of capital in unicorn firms. 175 This
Article introduces these new players 176 and describes the
market dynamics that contribute to the trend toward unicorn
firms delaying their IPOs.177
There is a heated debate in Silicon Valley about whether
the use of golden handcuffs is fair due to these new market
dynamics.178 Traditional stock option contracts were based on
the principle that it will take a startup about four years to go
public; however, startups today are staying private longer,
174 See Paul Gompers, William Gornall, Steven N. Kaplan & Ilya A.
Strebulaev, How Do Venture Capitalists Make Decisions? 2 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22587, 2016).
175 See Sungjoung Kwon, Michelle Lowry & Yiming Qian, Mutual Fund
Investments in Private Firms 1 (Sept. 20, 2018) (unpublished
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2941203 [perma.cc/B65L-4W4S].
176 Chernenko et al. show that:

[O]ver the 2010–2016 period, the number of distinct funds
directly investing in unicorns has increased from less than
10 to more than 140. . . . The dollar value of aggregate
holdings has also increased by an order of magnitude, from
less than $1 billion to more than $8 billion. These results
paint a consistent picture of unicorn investments becoming
a more important part of the portfolios of open-end mutual
funds.
Chernenko et al., supra note 4, at 20; see also William Gornall & Ilya A.
Strebulaev, Squaring Venture Capital Valuations with Reality 2 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23895, 2017) (“A number of
the largest U.S. mutual fund providers, such as Fidelity Investments and T.
Rowe Price, have begun investing their assets directly in unicorns.”).
177 Kwon et al., supra note 175, at 2. Kwon et al. further show that these
large amounts of capital “should enable companies to stay private longer.”
Id. at 27.
178 See infra Part IV.
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averaging about eleven years.179 This delay causes lock-in and
illiquidity for unicorn shares. Additionally, because unicorn
valuations are very high prior to IPOs, options are often
prohibitively expensive to exercise for some employees.
Unicorns accordingly face pressure to seek alternative
employee compensation mechanisms and contractual
arrangements.180
Unicorn employees are faced with a dilemma—if their
options are expiring (or if they leave the firm), they must
choose between forfeiting their options and thereby reducing
their chances of getting rich (thus forfeiting a significant
portion of the compensation package to which they initially
agreed), or exercising their options and paying taxes on profit
that may never materialize.
As a result of this crisis, the National Venture Capital
Association and Palantir Technologies lobbied Congress on
both the House and Senate versions of the “Empowering
Employees through Stock Ownership Act.” 181 The purpose of
the Act was to provide an extended deferral period and to ease
the tax burden to employees. 182 The material portions of these
bills are included in section 13603 of the new Tax Cuts and
Jobs Act (the “Tax Act”).183 New section 83(i) of the Internal
Revenue Code allows certain individuals to elect to defer for
up to five years.184 This legislation is part of a broader push
Gao et al., supra note 6; Doidge et al., Eclipse of the Public
Corporation, supra note 6.
180 See supra Section III.C.
181 Francine McKenna, Unicorn Lobby Pushes Back on Stock-Option
Move in Republican Tax Bill, MARKET WATCH (Nov. 13, 2017),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/unicorn-lobby-pushes-back-onexecutive-compensation-move-in-republican-tax-bill-2017-11-13
[https://perma.cc/X943-9ZGC].
182 Id.
183 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97 § 13603, 31 Stat. 2054,
2159–64 (2017).
184 New Internal Revenue Code section 83(i) allows certain individuals
to elect to defer recognizing income on qualified stock options and restricted
stock units for up to five years. I.R.C. § 83(i) (West 2017). The new rule
evolved from a 2016 Senate bill, sponsored by Senators Mark Warner and
179
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by unicorns to encourage their employees to receive equity
compensation.
Is the IPO market broken? Scholars such as Gao, Ritter,
and Zhu, maintain that it is not. 185 On the contrary, despite
fewer U.S. offerings today than in the mid-90s, average
annual proceeds from U.S. IPOs have greatly increased.186
Today’s public companies not only raise more capital; they are
also more stable, as evidenced by fewer de-listings.187
This Article does not take a stance on whether the IPO
market is broken or not. Rather, building on the works of de
Fontenay,188 Fried and Broughman,189 and Ewens and FarreMensa,190 it adopts the view that there are multiple factors
that contribute to the decline in IPOs. This Article instead
focuses on the factors that contributed to the rise in unicorn
startup firms, especially factors that influence founders’
decisions to go public or continue to grow while staying
private.191
Dean Heller, the Empowering Employees Through Stock Ownership Act, S.
3152, 114th Cong. (2016) and a companion House bill, H.R. 5719, 114th
Cong. (2016). The purpose was to provide an extended deferral period of up
to seven years for employees who exercise options to buy the stock of private
companies to ease the tax burden arising from equity grants covering shares
that are not publicly traded. See McKenna, supra note 181.
185 See Gao et al., supra note 6, at 1691.
186 EY REPORT, supra note 165, at 2.
187 See id.
188 See de Fontenay, supra note 3, at 448 (“[W]hile critics blame the
increase in regulation for the decline of public equity, the ongoing
deregulation of private capital raising arguably played the greater role.”).
189 See Broughman & Fried, supra note 167, at 2. According to
Broughman and Fried, Mark Zuckerberg is not the rule, but rather the
exception. Id. at 1. They prove, contrary to traditional finance theory,
especially Black & Gilson’s “call option on control” theory linking VC and
stock markets, that the “ex ante likelihood of founders reacquiring control
at IPO is extremely low[.]” Id. at 2. They focus on control that is both strong
(where “founders have enough voting power to ensure they remain in the
saddle”) and durable (control that lasts at least three years). Id. at 2, 6–7.
190 Ewens & Farre-Mensa, supra note 18, at 7.
191 Empirical evidence suggests that active markets actually have a
negative effect on innovative investment strategies. See Daniel Ferreira,
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B. New Equity Capital Providers
The institutional private market is robust and expanding,
and “private markets are the new public markets,” according
to Matt Levine.192 Unicorn firms now regularly raise
substantial funding from investors who traditionally invested
in public companies,193 such as large U.S. mutual funds (e.g.
Fidelity and T. Rowe Price)194 and sovereign wealth funds
from China, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and other countries.195
Fidelity, for example, holds the second-highest number of
unicorns in any portfolio.196 Fidelity joins new and existing
market players: VCs, private equity, angel investors,197

Gustavo Manso & André C. Silva, Incentives to Innovate and the Decision to
Go Public or Private, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 256, 256 (2014) (“[I]t is optimal to
go public when exploiting existing ideas and optimal to go private when
exploring new ideas.”); see also Filippo Belloc, Innovation in State-Owned
Enterprises: Reconsidering the Conventional Wisdom, 48 J. ECON. ISSUES
821, 827 (2014) (“[P]ublicly traded securities require disclosure of all the
relevant information and their market prices quickly react to business
successes and failures, thereby encouraging insiders to choose conventional
projects.”).
192 Matt Levine, Opinion, Something Is Lost When Companies Stay
Private, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/
articles/2018-04-04/something-is-lost-when-companies-stay-private (on file
with the Columbia Business Law Review).
193 See Chernenko et al., supra note 4, at 2; see also Gornall &
Strebulaev, supra note 176, at 2; Kwon et al., supra note 175, at 37.
194 Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 176, at 2.
195 See PITCHBOOK, supra note 9, at 4–5.
196 See id.; see also Jeff Schwartz, Should Mutual Funds Invest in
Startups? A Case Study of Fidelity Magellan Fund’s Investments in
Unicorns (and Other Startups) and the Regulatory Implications, 95 N.C. L.
REV. 1341, 1343 (2017).
197 See MARK VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBERT J. ROBINSON, ANGEL
INVESTING: MATCHING STARTUP FUNDS WITH STARTUP COMPANIES 5 (2000);
Darian M. Ibrahim, Financing the Next Silicon Valley, 87 WASH. U. L. REV.
717, 739 (2010) (“[I]nformal angel investing financed many of the
foundational start-ups in Silicon Valley and Route 128.”).
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clusters of angel investors, 198 corporate venture capital,199
crowdfunding platforms,200 sovereign wealth funds, and other
institutional investors, who are aggressively investing large
amounts of capital in emerging growth companies. 201 In
particular, mutual funds have significantly expanded their
investments in unicorns since 2010.202 Chernenko, Lerner,
and Zeng show that “over the 2010–2016 period, the number
of distinct funds directly investing in unicorns has increased
See FAQs for Angels & Entrepreneurs, ANGEL CAP. ASS’N,
https://www.angelcapitalassociation.org/faqs/#What_are_angel_groups_
[https://perma.cc/RAG3-6RJW] (“Many angel groups co-invest with other
angel groups, individual angels and early-stage venture capitalists to make
investments of $500,000 to $2 million per round.”); see also Benjamin
Gomes-Casseres, Alliances, Inter-firm, ROUTLEDGE ENCYC. OF INT’L POL.
ECON. 27 (R. J. Barry Jones ed., 2001) (“An ‘inter-firm alliance’ is an
organizational structure established to govern an incomplete contract
between separate firms and in which each firm has limited control.”); Robert
Pitofsky, A Framework for Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures, 54
ANTITRUST L.J. 893 (1985); T George Harris, The Post-Capitalist Executive:
An Interview with Peter F. Drucker, HARV. BUS. REV., May–June 1993, at
114, 116 (“Today businesses grow through alliances, all kinds of dangerous
liaisons and joint ventures, which, by the way, very few people
understand.”); Joseph A. McCahery & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Corporate
Governance and Innovation: Venture Capital, Joint Ventures, and Family
Businesses (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 65/2006,
2006) (discussing corporate governance for joint ventures).
199 See Ronald W. Masulis & Rajarishi Nahata, Financial Contracting
with Strategic Investors: Evidence from Corporate Venture Capital Backed
IPOs, 18 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 599, 627 (2009) (“[L]ead CVCs have lower
board representation than lead traditional VCs, which is consistent with the
entrepreneur’s desire to limit CVC influence, particularly at the earliest
stages of a start-up’s life.”); Henry W. Chesbrough, Making Sense of
Corporate Venture Capital, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 2002, at 90, 92 (“[The]
definition excludes investments made through an external fund managed
by a third party, even if the investment vehicle is funded by and specifically
designed to meet the objectives of a single investing company.”).
200 See generally Joan MacLeod Heminway, Securities Crowdfunding
and Investor Protection, CESIFO DICE REP., Summer 2016, at 11,
http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/dice-report-2016-2-heminway-june.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C3RV-D23F].
201 See EY REPORT, supra note 165, at 8.
202 Kwon et al., supra note 175, at 1.
198
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from less than 10 to more than 140.” 203 Kwon, Lowery, and
Qian add that unicorn startups are now able to raise large
amounts of capital from mutual funds, and this capital should
enable the “companies to stay private longer.”204 Moreover,
mutual funds currently hold more than $8 billion in unicorn
firms, and this number is increasing.205 Clearly, unicorn
investments are “becoming a more important part of the
portfolios of open-end mutual funds.”206
The entrance of these new players changes the
equilibrium, allowing founders to demand more founderfriendly rounds. Raising capital for a startup company—even
if it is located in Silicon Valley and is backed by a VC—is an
extremely risky and challenging endeavor.207
The investments of mutual funds thus enable unicorn
founders to stay private longer, which founders prefer in order
to maintain control over the firm and to continue investing in
innovation. There is evidence that the social return on
research and development (especially early stage technology
development) is much higher than the private return on such

Chernenko et al., supra note 4, at 20.
Kwon et al., supra note 175, at 2.
205 Chernenko et al., supra note 4, at 20 (“The dollar value of aggregate
holdings has also increased by an order of magnitude, from less than $1
billion to more than $8 billion.”); see also Gornall & Strabulaev, supra note
176, at 2 (“While the total present VC exposure of mutual funds, at around
$7 billion, is small compared to the size of the mutual fund industry, there
has been a tenfold increase in just three years.”).
206 See Chernenko et al., supra note 4, at 20; see also Gornall &
Strabulaev, supra note 176. Additionally, third-party equity marketplaces
such as EquityZen allow individual investors to gain direct exposure to
these unicorns. See Vedant Suri, Unicorns, Dinosaurs & The Elephant
Room – An Update on the Tech Animal Kingdom, EQUITYZEN (Aug. 19,
2015),
https://equityzen.com/knowledge-center/blog/update-tech-animalkingdom [https://perma.cc/ES6X-RZ3J].
207 Ola Bengtsson & John R.M. Hand, CEO Compensation in VentureBacked Firms, 26 J. BUS. VENTURING 391, 410 (2011) (“Without multiple
injections of new capital, a firm of the type backed by venture capital is
likely to go bankrupt rather than realize its goal of going public or being
acquired.”).
203
204
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investment.208 Private investment allows the firm’s founder to
defer the costs associated with going public 209 and avoid the
pressures associated with being a public company,210
especially pressures to not invest in innovation and focus on

208 See Zvi Griliches, The Search for R&D Spillovers, 94 SCANDINAVIAN
J. ECON. 29, 32 (Supp. 1992).
209 Kwon et al., supra note 175, at 27. On the regulatory costs of going
public, see generally Anne Beyer, Daniel A. Cohen, Thomas Z. Lys &
Beverly R. Walther, The Financial Reporting Environment: Review of the
Recent Literature, 50 J. ACCT. & ECON. 296 (2010).
210 Another plausible cause for the rise of the unicorn firms is that
lucrative technology companies choose to stay private as long as possible in
order to escape the pressures toward short-term strategies that stem from
public ownership. See The Endangered Public Company, ECONOMIST (May
19, 2012), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2012/05/19/the-endangeredpublic-company. [https://perma.cc/7HJS-6T5Z]; see also LYNN STOUT, THE
SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS
INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 7 (2012) (asserting the shortterm focus of investors and corporate boards is currently one of the key
issues in the corporate governance debate); Thomas J. Chemmanur &
Yawen Jiao, Dual Class IPOs: A Theoretical Analysis, 36 J. BANKING & FIN.
305, 316 (2012). For discussion on shareholder value, see COLIN MAYER,
FIRM COMMITMENT (2013); see also Ira M. Millstein, Re-Examining Board
Priorities in an Era of Activism, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2013)
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/re-examining-board-priorities-inan-era-of-activism/?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/T434-PFH8]
(“[C]orporate
boards around the country should re-examine their priorities and figure out
to whom they owe their fiduciary duties.”); see also STOUT, supra, at 7. Stout
also expresses this concern with regards to the innovation ability of large
public companies. See Lynn A. Stout, The Corporation as a Time Machine:
Intergenerational Equity, Intergenerational Efficiency, and the Corporate
Form, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 685, 710–11 (2015); see also John Armour,
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What is Corporate Law?, in THE
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
(3d ed. 2017); David Ciepley, Beyond Public And Private: Toward a Political
Theory of the Corporation, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 139, 148–49 (2013); Bill
Buxton, The Price of Forgoing Basic Research, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 17, 2008),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2008-12-17/the-price-of-forgoingbasic-researchbusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financialadvice [perma.cc/7R96-JCK4]; Out of the Dusty Labs, ECONOMIST (Mar. 1,
2007), http://www.economist.com/node/8769863 [https://perma.cc/M5S5Q6DU].
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short-term results.211 As a result of the entrance of these new
market players, unicorn founders now have more leverage to
negotiate founder friendly rounds with venture capital firms,
who continue to play an important role in the governance
structure of startup firms.212
Policymakers, regulators, and scholars should take these
new market trends into account and advance the traditional
entrepreneurship literature, which has focused on VCs as the
dominant source of financing start-ups over the last thirty
years.213 Future research or other papers can address the
question of mutual funds’ and sovereign wealth funds’
incentives for investing in early stage technology development
when they cannot capture the full benefits of such
technologies.214

C. Changes to Governance Structure of Unicorns
New entrepreneurial startup firms aspire to receive VC
backing and become the next Apple, Facebook, Cisco, Google,

211 Kwon et al., supra note 175, at 38. See also John Asker, Joan FarreMensa & Alexander Ljungqvist, Corporate Investment and Stock Market
Listing: A Puzzle?, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 342, 346 (2015) (showing empirical
results that private firms invest substantially more than public ones, and
that private firms’ investment decisions are around four times more
responsive to changes in investment opportunities than are those of public
firms).
212 See Robert P. Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the
False Dichotomy of the Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 37, 44 (2006)
(proposing a new dynamic agency cost model of the firm).
213 See Gompers et al., supra note 174, at 2.
214 See, e.g., BRANSCOMB & AUERSWALD, supra note 48, at 14–15;
Bronwyn H. Hall, The Private and Social Returns to Research and
Development, in TECHNOLOGY, R&D, AND THE ECONOMY 140, 159–60 (Bruce
L.R. Smith & Claude E. Barfield eds., 1996) (providing evidence that the
social return to R&D is much above the private return); Griliches, supra
note 208, at 32–33 (evaluating calculations of the social rates of return for
research and development); Yoram Margalioth, Not a Panacea for Economic
Growth: The Case of Accelerated Depreciation, 26 VA. TAX REV. 493, 501
(2007).
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or Intel.215 VC-backed startups are the primary force in the
economy responsible for both job creation and economic
growth.216
Furthermore, according to Gompers and Lerner,217 if a
startup firm does not have VC backing, the chances are high
(approximately ninety percent) that the firm will fail within
three years from its formation.218
Many scholars consider the American-VC market an
essential element of the U.S. national innovation system, and
it has been extensively imitated around the world.219 By
financing capital hungry young start-ups, who present
abundant hazards and uncertainties that often deter other
“regular” investors, VC investors continue to help to promote
innovation in the U.S. (and around the world.) 220
The ways in which VCs fund innovation dominates the
entrepreneurial finance literature.221 A skillful VC fund will

215 See Mary J. Dent, A Rose by Any Other Name: How Labels Get in
the Way of U.S. Innovation Policy, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 128, 134 (2011).
216 See id. at 134–35.
217 See Lerner & Gompers, supra note 48 (“For newly launched
enterprises without venture capital backing, failure is almost assured:
nearly 90 percent fail within three years.”).
218 Id. This alarming study illustrates the authenticity of a well-known
expression about the financing gap in the startup world called the “valley of
death.” See supra note 48. It refers to the difficulty of entrepreneurs to cover
the negative cash flow in the early stages of their startup firm, before their
new product or service is commercialized and brings in revenue from real
customers or investors. See generally id.
219 See David H. Hsu & Martin Kenney, Organizing Venture Capital:
The Rise and Demise of American Research & Development Corporation,
1946–1973, 14 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 579, 579 (2005).
220 VCs face similar hazards and uncertainties. According to a report
by the U.S. General Accounting Office, only ten percent of such funds
manage to earn their expected return on their investment. See GAO REPORT,
supra note 47, at 19 (citation omitted). According to Hsu and Kenney, VC
has even been developed into an asset category, which is commonly
acknowledged by large U.S. institutional and pension funds. Hsu & Kenney,
supra note 219, at 1.
221 See Ibrahim, supra note 197, at 720.
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help the startup develop the company. 222 Not only do VCs
provide a startup (budding or unicorn) with cash, 223 but also,
and more importantly, the VC managers provide services such
as mentoring to budding startups and networks of additional
investors, potential acquirers, new partners and customers.224
Founders, however, may worry about their ability to
maintain control over the firm following new rounds of
financing. The traditional pattern is that the founders get
diluted and must give up voting control to secure more
funding.225 If the VC has control over the board of directors, it
can also fire the founders. In fact, Fried and Broughman show
that the Mark Zuckerberg’s example (of a founder
maintaining control after an IPO) is an exception and not the
rule.226 Fried and Broughman challenge Black and Gilson’s
traditional “call option on control” finance theory, which links
VC and stock markets, and they further prove that the ex-ante
likelihood of founders reacquiring control via IPO is extremely
low.227
Recent research further shows that there is an increase in
the number of technology companies that decide to go public
with dual class of share structures because their founders
See DAN SENOR & SAUL SINGER, START-UP NATION: THE STORY OF
ISRAEL’S ECONOMIC MIRACLE 161 (2009); see also Lindsey, supra note 50, at
1137 (noting that venture capital firms add value by facilitating interaction
within their networks); Ola Bengtsson & David H. Hsu, How Do Venture
Capital Partners Match with Startup Founders? (Mar. 11, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript) (finding that founders seek VC partners with
complementary
experience),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1568131 [https://perma.cc/9HS3-9JJW].
223 SENOR & SINGER, supra note 222, at 161.
224 See id.; Lindsey, supra note 50, at 1139 (discussing the value
venture capitalists add by “helping firms to recruit key managers . . .
monitoring and advising through service on the company’s Board of
Directors . . . implementing other strong governance mechanisms . . . . [and]
[f]acilitating strategic alliances[.]”).
225 Bob Zider, How Venture Capital Works, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.–Dec.
1998, https://hbr.org/1998/11/how-venture-capital-works [https://perma.cc/
999W-U7KR].
226 See Broughman & Fried, supra note 167.
227 Id.
222
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want to avoid the pressures of short-termism and push to
retain more influence over “their” firms, the management, and
strategy.228
Recent governance and share issuance strategies have also
enabled some unicorn founders to maintain control over their
company. Changes have been made to the traditional model of
startup funding and the governance structures of VC-backed
firms as founders of unicorn firms push to stay private longer
and maintain control over the firm. Founders are able to do so
by impeding a sale, where VC-investment rounds are
structured as “friendly” financing rounds.
As noted above, VC-backed startups in the United States
have historically issued two classes of stock: common and
preferred, which includes several series with new rounds of
financing. New practices have altered the traditional model of
financing and startup governance structure, which have in
turn have provided founders with leverage in their
negotiations with VCs (resulting in founder-friendly terms in
formation and financing documents).
Super-voting stock allows unicorn founders to maintain
control over the company for a longer period of time as founder
approval is needed for any future amendments of the charter
(such amendments are required for most rounds of financings
and approving liquidation events and sales.)229
Unicorn founders wishing to use this structure will
typically prepare the company’s formation documents to

228 See Joann S. Lublin & Spencer E. Ante, A Fight in Silicon Valley:
Founders Push for Control, WALL ST. J., (July 11, 2012),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303292204577519134168
240996 (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review). According to
Broughman and Fried, however, only fifteen percent of VC-backed IPOs
from 2010 to 2012 were dual class. Broughman & Fried, supra note 167, at
24 tbl.2.
229 See Jonathan Axelrad, Founder Friendly Stock Alternatives I:
Keeping Control and Super-Voting Common Stock, DLA PIPER,
https://www.dlapiperaccelerate.com/knowledge/2017/founder-friendlystock-alternatives-keeping-control-and-super-voting-common-stock-.html
[https://perma.cc/A8A4-EJWP].
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provide for two types of common stock (Classes A and B.)230
Class B will carry multiple votes per share (such as ten to
twenty) and will be granted to the founders.231 Class A will
carry only one vote per share and will be reserved for issuance,
under the unicorn’s stock option plan, to rank-and-file
employees.232
This structure is designed to give founders control over the
company in their capacity as shareholders, even if their
ownership stake is diluted in the future through additional
rounds of financing. It should be noted that the founders will
have to have leverage to negotiate this friendly-term with VCs
and other investors in each rounds of financing. It is not
guaranteed to last forever, even if included in formation
documents.
Super-voting stock at the board level is another use of
common stock, which confers a multiple of votes for board
seats (such as a multiple of two to five per vote) to its
holder.233 This type of common stock gives founders the power
to elect directors to the board and have control over the board’s
major decisions.234 This structure can have adverse effects on
the board’s ability to follow its fiduciary duties, but those
issues fall outside the scope of this Article.
FF preferred stock is a new type of common stock that does
not have the traditional lock-in.235 It is issued to founders, like
See id.
See id.
232 Facebook, Palantir, Snapchat, Uber, and Airbnb each issued two
classes of common stock with the preferred class in each case carrying ten
votes per share and the common stock carrying one. See Cytowski &
Partners, The Anatomy of a Unicorn, MEDIUM (Aug. 15, 2018),
https://medium.com/@cytlaw/the-anatomy-of-a-unicorn-3298df383e03
[https://perma.cc/35V7-3ZZX]; see also Caine Moss & Emma MannMeginniss, 5 Founder-Friendly Financing Terms that Give Power to
Entrepreneurs,
VENTURE
BEAT
(Nov.
16,
2014),
https://venturebeat.com/2014/11/16/5-founder-friendly-financing-termsthat-give-power-to-entrepreneurs/ [https://perma.cc/Z5EA-BYF7].
233 See Moss & Mann-Meginniss, supra note 232.
234 See id.
235 See id.
230
231
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common stock, but has a special conversion right that allows
its holder to cash out prior to a traditional liquidity event such
as an IPO or sale.236 The company will issue a portion of the
founder’s equity in the form of FF preferred stock, and the rest
in regular common stock.237 The FF preferred stock allows the
founder to get liquidity with future VC investment.238 The VC
can buy the FF preferred stock from the founder, and the FF
preferred stock is then converted to the investor’s preferred
stock.239 This practice can impact the company’s option plan
(affect the price at which the options are issued,) and have
adverse tax consequences for the founder and the company.240
Typically, VCs negotiate for and get voting-control
provisions, which give them voting blocks on liquidation and
raising additional capital. 241 By giving common stock holders
the same voting-control provisions, unicorns give founders the
freedom to dictate when and whether the company sells or
raises capital.242 VCs will always negotiate for and receive
some protections in their investment documents. If founders
are able to negotiate for the same protections, then they will
be able to limit the VC’s control over the decision to liquidate
the company.243
Founders are now also able to negotiate and receive
aggressive founder vesting provisions.244 The traditional
See id.
See id.
238 See id.
239 See id.
240 See id.
241 See Trent Dykes, Financing Your Startup: Understanding Control
and Voting Issues (Part I, Board Controls), VENTURE ALLEY (Mar. 3, 2011),
https://www.theventurealley.com/2011/03/financing-your-startupunderstanding-control-and-voting-issues-part-1-board-controls/
[https://perma.cc/7DV2-PTH8].
242 See Moss & Mann-Meginniss, supra note 232.
243 For example, Snapchat does not give its series C, D, E, or F preferred
shareholders any voting rights or anti-dilution protection, “essentially
allowing them to just invest and tag along for the ride.” Cytowski &
Partners, supra note 232.
244 See Moss & Mann-Meginniss, supra note 232.
236
237
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vesting schedule is four-year with a one-year cliff vesting.245
Certain founders are negotiating for an accelerated vesting
time frame of three years or less, sometimes without the cliff
vesting.246 These terms for acceleration become effective in
the event of a change of control provisions or involuntary
terminations of the founders without cause. 247
These structures can, like super-voting stock at the board
level, have adverse effects on the board’s fiduciary duties and
can also subject the investors to a hold up and abuse by the
founders. However, these issues are outside the scope of this
Article.

IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Stock option plans and equity compensation agreements
have been used by private companies for many years. Options
were traditionally designed with a timeframe of four years to
IPO or sale. Today, however, unicorns are staying private
longer, and conducting an IPO or a sale much later: on
average after eleven years, and, in many cases, not at all.248
During this long period, there is always a chance that the
value of the unicorn’s common stock will drop below the strike
price, rendering the options practically worthless to their
holder.
Additionally, the unicorn’s valuation might fluctuate after
the firm grants options to employees. These scenarios can lead
to employees with out-of-the-money options. Because it is

See id.
See generally Founder Vesting: An Alternative View, MEDIUM (Feb.
10, 2017), https://medium.com/@whoneedslaw/some-say-that-vesting-isthe-most-important-thing-for-startup-founders-639b6583d8d2
[https://perma.cc/7CL4-Q42F].
247 See Moss & Mann-Meginniss, supra note 232.
248 See Doidge et al., Eclipse of the Public Corporation, supra note 6;
Gao et al., supra note 6; see also Jay R. Ritter, Initial Public Offerings:
Updated Statistics, U. FLA., https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/
2016/03/Initial-Public-Offerings-Updated-Statistics-2016-03-08.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DD66-TC3W].
245
246
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usually illegal to backdate employee options, 249 unicorns will
be compelled to re-issue options to employees in order to keep
them motivated. Unicorn firms should experiment with
revisions to traditional equity compensation plans in order to
recreate the incentives and alignment of interests that were
present before the new equilibrium.
Start-ups can deal with the tax considerations and
illiquidity of unicorn shares in several ways. Section IV.A
presents the currently proposed alternatives to the traditional
stock option plan (and employee contract), and critiques them.
Section IV.B describes the present alternatives to the
traditional liquidity mechanisms and discusses their pitfalls.
Section IV.C proposes new disclosure requirements as an
alternative route to fixing these issues.

A. Contractual Alternatives
Unicorn firms and the pool of employees are repeat players
in aggressive technology markets. The unicorn employees are
the intellectual “assets” of the firm, and the firm depends on
their talent to innovate and grow. High turnover rates are
therefore detrimental to a unicorn’s business model. The firm
also cares a great deal about maintaining its reputation.
Companies with a bad reputation will probably have a harder
time attracting new talent, in such competitive markets.
As discussed above, unicorn employees are increasingly
discontent with their equity compensation because of extreme
“lock-in” of their capital due to the illiquidity of their stock and
the fact that founders, senior management, and some
investors are not in a rush to do an IPO. Further, several
recent changes to market dynamics and new market players
(mutual funds and sovereign wealth funds) give unicorn
founders (the common shareholders) greater power vis-à-vis
preferred shareholders to impede a sale and keep the company
private longer. All these factors contribute to the shift in
employees’ expectations.
See Jesse M. Fried, Option Backdating and Its Implications, 65
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 853, 855 (2008).
249
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The high-tech industry is plagued with uncertainty and
information asymmetry, as discussed above.250 There is a
view in finance and economics251 that contracts have limits
and that reputational threats to parties serve as a disciplining
device. According to incomplete contracting theory, the stock
option plans and other equity compensation agreements
between the unicorn firm and its employees are subject to
renegotiation. A contract cannot prevent unforeseen
contingencies that can trigger conflicts between the parties in
the future.252 Renegotiation therefore is necessary because
unicorn firms likely care about their reputation. Unicorn
firms could also experiment with alternative contracting and
organizational solutions to better monitor their labor force
and deal with their employees’ public complaints.
This Section raises the question of whether such
renegotiations can reach optimal employee contract for the
different types of unicorn employees, including rank and file,
management, and founders. There are many problems that
arise when designing employment contracts and aligning
employee incentives. Several incentive problems are
addressed in the following sections, including those created by
preferred stock liquidation preferences (“overhang”)253 or by
lack of liquidity.

See supra notes 123–26 and accompanying text.
The principal-agent problem is an essential element of the
“incomplete contracts” view of the firm. See, e.g., Philippe Aghion & Patrick
Bolton, An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting, 59
REV. ECON. STUD. 473 (1992); R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4
ECONOMICA 386 (1937); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation
of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983); Stuart L. Hart, A
Natural-Resource-Based View of the Firm, 20 ACAD. MGMT. R EV. 986 (1995);
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 51; see also W. Bentley MacLeod,
Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts
(Ctr. for Econ. Studies & Ifo Inst. for Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
1730, 2006), https://ssrn.com/abstract=885347 [https://perma.cc/843TXUQE].
252 See Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term
Contracts, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 2005 (1987).
253 Broughman & Fried, supra note 20, at 385.
250
251
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Unicorn firms currently use (and will likely continue to
use) equity compensation aggressively (including stock option
or restricted stock units) to attract, engage, and retain talent.
The following are some alternatives that are used to deal with
the current issues that arise concerning incentive
compensation for different kinds of employees, including those
with options that are about to expire and others who wish to
leave (triggering the ninety-day exercise window).
This Section presents and critiques these alternatives, and
make suggestions for the future. The suggestions are meant
to allow employees to maintain their incentive compensation
and perhaps defer their tax liability. They do not solve the
liquidity problem, but liquidity is also discussed herein.

1. Outright Stock Grants to Founders
For founders, outright stock grants (instead of options) are
typical and are usually issued at the formation stage of the
business.254 The advantages of issuing outright stock to
founders is that the stock is issued at a low price (as valuation
of the company has yet to take off) and it gives them certain
benefits of direct stock ownership. It also avoids some of the
tax drawbacks of stock options. 255
As noted in Part III, the founders at unicorn firms are
already capable of protecting their interests. Often, they are
the ones who are pushing the companies to stay private
longer. Accordingly, the equity compensation problems
discussed herein are largely not relevant to unicorn founders.

2. Section 83(i) Election for Early Employees
Early employees who join a startup at the formation stages
(pre-unicorn status) can make a section 83(i) election (which
is analogous to the section 83(b) election) if all the

See CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY & CRAIG E. DAUCHY, THE ENTREPRENEUR’S
GUIDE TO LAW AND STRATEGY 96 (5th ed. 2018).
255 Id. at 96.
254
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requirements are met.256 These elections trigger the holding
period, allowing employees to meet the requirements for longterm capital gains rates. The election must be made no later
than thirty days after the option exercise or restricted stock
unit vesting date.
While use of the section 83(i) election does not solve the
illiquidity problem, it prevents early employees from carrying
the excessive risk of paying large amounts of money out-ofpocket for exercising and paying taxes for profit that might
not materialize.257

3. Extensions to Post Termination Exercise
Periods
As noted above, there is a heated debate in Silicon Valley
over the fairness of the ninety-day stock option exercise period
for departing employees.258 Ex-employees of unicorn firms
complain that they helped build the unicorn, but after leaving
the firm, cannot enjoy the fruits of their labor. Instead, they
were faced with a dilemma—to exercise or forfeit? The
256 On the section 83(b) election, see id. at 485; see also Ronald J. Gilson
& David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A Tax
Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARV. L. REV. 874, 894–95
(2003); David I. Walker, The Non-Option: Understanding the Dearth of
Discounted Employee Stock Options, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1505, 1556–57 (2009).
257 See Bruce Brumberg, IRS Guidance on Private Company Grants of
Stock Options and RSUs Provide Limited Support, FORBES (Dec. 10, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucebrumberg/2018/12/10/irs-guidance-onprivate-company-grants-of-stock-options-and-rsus-provides-limitedsupport/#336702746eb9 [https://perma.cc/6JJS-7AWK]; J. Marc Fosse &
Angel L. Garrett, Section 83(i) of the Internal Revenue Code – Qualified
Equity Grant Programs Permit Employees to Elect to Defer Income Taxes on
Stock Options or RSUs, TRUCKER HUSS (Jan. 11, 2018),
https://www.truckerhuss.com/2018/01/new-section-83i-of-the-internalrevenue-code-qualified-equity-grant-programs-permit-employees-to-electto-defer-income-taxes-on-stock-options-or-rsus/
[https://perma.cc/S5BYKERK].
258 See, e.g., Dash Victor, Extending the Option Exercise Period — A
Tactical Guide,
MEDIUM
(Feb.
9,
2016),
https://medium.com/
@dashvictor/extending-the-option-exercise-period-a-tactical-guide16e0c10ec46d [https://perma.cc/7Z7P-9E3N].
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unicorns’ valuations are by definition very high, but some
employees cannot afford to pay for the taxes and exercise
price. Even if they were able to pay, the gain may never
materialize if the company never goes public or its value
declines below the strike price.259
To deal with these complaints, several companies
including Quora,260 Pinterest,261 and Coinbase,262 have made
changes to their option plans, extending the exercise period
for ex-employees to anywhere from one to ten-years.263
There is a call in Silicon Valley for other unicorns to join
these firms and extend their exercise periods. 264 By extending
post-termination exercise periods, companies would help
encourage equality among unicorn employees. Ex-employees
259 See Phil Haslett, Weekly Update #216: What the 90-Day Option
Exercise
Rule
Means
for
Pre-IPO
Secondaries,
EQUITYZEN,
https://equityzen.com/knowledge-center/newsletter/weekly-update-216/
[https://perma.cc/Y8J5-UTNP] (discussing layoffs); Connie Loizos, Dear
Unicorn,
Exit
Please,
TECHCRUNCH
(July
23,
2015),
https://techcrunch.com/2015/07/23/dear-unicorn-exit-please/
[https://perma.cc/DX8U-6TM2].
260 Ed Zimmerman, Stock Options: VC-Backed Startups Extend PostTermination Exercise Period (PTEP), FORBES (Aug. 27, 2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/edwardzimmerman/2017/08/27/stock-optionsvc-backed-startups-extend-post-termination-exercise-periodptep/#7c7517595568 [https://perma.cc/7XF6-FWG8].
261 See Lynda Galligan, Startups Take Note: Pinterest Will Allow ExEmployees to Keep Vested Stock Options for Seven Years, FOUNDERS
WORKBENCH
BLOG
(Mar.
26,
2015),
https://www.foundersworkbench.com/startups-take-note-pinterest-willallow-ex-employees-to-keep-vested-stock-options-for-seven-years/
[https://perma.cc/DB5D-LT4E] (noting that Pinterest granted a seven-year
stock option extension for employees with at least two years of tenure at the
company).
262 See Brian Armstrong, Improving Equity Compensation at Coinbase,
COINBASE BLOG (Aug. 5, 2015), https://blog.coinbase.com/improving-equitycompensation-at-coinbase-8749979409c3 [https://perma.cc/LN6K-73E6].
263 See Victor, supra note 258.
264 See Harj Taggar, Fixing the Inequity of Startup Equity, TRIPLEBYTE
(Mar. 5, 2016), https://triplebyte.com/blog/fixing-the-inequity-of-startupequity [https://perma.cc/Z6GW-3PX4] (discussing a proposal by Y
Combinator, a VC, calling for a ten-year rule).
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would be able to choose whether or not to exercise the options
at a later date, taking into consideration liquidity events (such
as an IPO) that make exercising worthwhile.265
This call for a one-size-fits-all adoption of extended
exercise windows is a flawed solution, though.266 The
extension of exercise windows will benefit ex-employees (who
are not contributing to the firm any longer), but will also be to
the detriment of the current unicorn employees who are still
contributing.267 In other words, an extended exercise window
will cause a “direct wealth transfer” 268 from the current
employees, who choose to stay and contribute to the company’s
growth, to ex-employees, who may even be working for a
competitor.269
Such a broad rule is detrimental to a firm’s ability to
retain, engage and attract employees. If such a rule is
adopted, employees are incentivized to diversify their
investments by quitting their jobs immediately after receiving
equity options. These incentives are exacerbated by the real
risk that the unicorn will never IPO, will fail, or will enter into
a trade sale. The employees will then join another tech
company to get more options from the new employer, while
maintaining a ten-year option to exercise from the previous
employer, without contributing to the growth of the
company.270
Moreover, extending the exercise period may be
cumbersome for companies, who will be required to keep track
of a larger number of common shareholders. This concern is
especially relevant when common shareholder approval is
needed for authorization for certain actions, such as for
Kupor, supra note 2.
See Taggar, supra note 264.
267 See Kupor, supra note 2.
268 Irvin Chan developed a simple model of this wealth transfer. See id.
His model shows that when ninety-day windows are extended to ten years,
current employees suffer an eighty percent dilution, while former
employees, who no longer contribute to the company’s growth, get to keep
their options. See id.
269 See id.
270 See id.
265
266
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issuance of new shares to existing or new employees,
acquisitions, or raising capital. However, this approach may
work better for the growing number of dual-class companies,
in which founders retain some control even as the number of
outstanding common shares grows.
This practice will contribute to the existing problem of exor current unicorn employees (and other investors), who turn
to secondary markets for liquidity. Under federal securities
laws, the sale on these platforms can be challenged if the
seller failed to disclose all material information about the
stock to the buyer.
Finally, the differing tax treatment between ISOs and
NSOs discussed earlier limits the efficacy of this proposal.
From a tax implication perspective, ISOs receive better tax
treatment, but according to the current tax code, ISOs that
are not exercised within ninety-days of departure become
NSOs.271 Extending the exercise period therefore undermines
the benefits of ISOs’ more favorable tax treatment.272

4. Back-End Loaded Stock Vesting
Another suggestion that has been floated is issuing backend loaded stock options.273 This suggestion changes the
traditional cliff vesting method to discourage employees from
leaving the firm,274 and follows Snapchat’s example. Snapchat
structured their vesting schedule so that employees vested ten
percent after the first year, twenty percent after the second

See supra Section II.A.2.
See supra Section II.A.2.
273 See Scott Kupor, Recommendations for Startup Employee Option
Plans,
ANDREESSEN
HOROWITZ
(July
26,
2016),
https://a16z.com/2016/07/26/options-plan/ [https://perma.cc/39LH-AMP9].
274 A clawback provision is usually added to employment contracts to
control incentives and option payouts. If the performance, for example,
should worsen, the clawback provision forces the employee to give a portion
of the money back. If it is back-ended, the employee may end up with little
equity if the company decides that she is not performing at the fourth year.
271
272
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year, thirty percent after the third, and forty percent at the
end of the fourth year.275
Labor law considerations are significant for this practice
because unicorns are private firms, and most of them are
located in Silicon Valley. 276 Therefore, California labor law
will apply to companies and employees located in California,
considering that “labor is one of two key inputs to the firm”.277
Back-end loaded stock vesting therefore exposes the
company to potential litigation for wrongful termination. One
of the reasons for the traditional design of cliff vesting is to
protect the company from “dead weight” lawsuits.278
275 See Jason Nazar, The Complete Guide to Understanding Equity
Compensation at Tech Companies, FORTUNE (Sept. 27, 2016),
http://fortune.com/2016/09/27/the-complete-guide-to-understanding-equitycompensation-at-tech-companies/ [https://perma.cc/7YWJ-2UL6]; see also
Kupor, supra note 273.
276 Silicon Valley traditionally benefited from open labor markets and
solid social networks, which drove entrepreneurship and experimentation.
Yet, today, Silicon Valley is at the center of a diversifying network of
economies and its status quo is changing, due to the openings of new
markets, the emergence of new international relationships, transformation
of the traditional startup financing model, and the rise of unicorn firms. See
Annalee Saxenian, The New Argonauts, WORDS INTO ACTION: INT’L
MONETARY FUND WORLD BANK GROUP BOARD OF GOVERNORS ANN. MEETINGS,
Sept. 11–20, 2006, at 99, 109, https://vdocuments.site/anna-lee-saxenianthe-new-argonauts.html [https://perma.cc/M2SE-3RT3]; see also ANNALEE
SAXENIAN, THE NEW ARGONAUTS: REGIONAL ADVANTAGE IN A GLOBAL
ECONOMY 37 (2006).
277 On the intersection of labor and capital as two principal inputs to
the firm, see Rock & Wachter, supra note 101, at 121; see also Edward B.
Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms and
the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619 (2001).
278 With regards to “dead weight” lawsuits, the California Counsel
Group notes:

No one likes dead weight, especially in a startup. As the
startup team continues to work hard creating value for the
company, an absent founder can create morale and
motivation issues among the rest of the team.
Why should absent founders get to share in the
potential upside of the company when they have stopped
doing what they said that they would do to create value for
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Generally, the employment at-will doctrine gives the company
the power to discharge the employee anytime without
cause.279 But certain states, including California, impose an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to even at-will
arrangements.280 Employees who are not carrying their
weight and are fired under the proposed arrangement can sue
the company for wrongful termination, claiming that the
company wrongfully discharged them to prevent a significant
percentage of their options from vesting and thereby deprived
them of benefits they had already “earned.” 281

5. Restricted Stock Units
Many companies, including Uber, issue Restricted Stock
Units (“RSU”s) once they reach the one-billion-dollar
valuation threshold.282 RSUs are a company’s promise to pay
a bonus in the form of shares or cash (in an amount equal to
the value of the share) to an employee in the future.283 RSUs,
like options, can be structured so that they vest over time once
the conditions are satisfied.
There are several advantages to using RSUs. First, RSUs
are not as risky for employees; unlike options, RSUs have
downside protection, because they do not have a strike
the company? Put simply – they shouldn’t. And that’s why it
is critical that each startup establish vesting arrangements
among the founders from the start.
Stock Vesting: How It Works and Why It Matters, CAL. COUNS. GROUP,
https://calcounselgroup.com/2017/05/22/stock-vesting-how-it-works-andwhy-it-matters/ [https://perma.cc/AB5M-BEQK] (emphasis in original).
279 See generally Wendy J. Hannum, Good Cause: California’s New
Exception to the At-Will Employment Doctrine, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 263
(1983).
280 Id.
281 See, e.g., Scully v. US WATS, Inc., 238 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 2001).
282 See AJ Frank, Don’t Let Recruiters Trick You (Or How to Evaluate
an Offer from a Technology Company), MEDIUM (Jan. 9, 2018),
https://medium.com/@ajfrank/dont-let-recruiters-trick-you-or-how-toevaluate-an-offer-from-a-technology-company-d3344b4c07b7
[https://perma.cc/4YYC-VK5C].
283 BAGLEY & SAVAGE, supra note 46, at 531.
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price.284 Second, unlike options, RSUs will not be worthless as
they are not subject to the unicorn stock price fluctuations.
RSUs will always have value equal to the price of the stock
regardless of when they were granted to employees. Third,
granting RSUs helps the company mitigate the risk of
employees trading on secondary markets, as RSUs cannot be
sold prior to an IPO.285
RSUs are a good solution for wealthy cash-hoarding
unicorns, as opposed to cash-poor early startups, as the
unicorn can pay the employee in cash or by stock upon
vesting.286 Unlike the option, employees can hold on to the
RSUs until they fully vest upon a liquidity event even if they
already left the unicorn.287
Although RSUs have greater downside risk protection,
they have less upside potential. Employees will generally
receive fewer RSUs for the same maturity because RSUs have
value regardless of how well the issuing company performs
after the grant. Additionally, according to section 409A of the
Internal Revenue Code,288 RSUs are taxed as ordinary income
when received, if the vesting conditions are satisfied. The
employees only receive long-term capital gains tax treatment
if they convert their RSUs to stock and hold the stock for more
than twelve months. Additionally, as RSUs cannot be sold on
a secondary market, they do not solve the illiquidity problem.

284 See Jeron Paul, RSUs vs. Options: Why RSUs (Restricted Stock
Units) Could Be Better Than Stock Options at Your Private Company,
CAPSHARE BLOG (July 9, 2016), https://www.capshare.com/blog/rsus-vsoptions/ [http://perma.cc/F9H5-JTB4].
285 See generally A Guide to Employee Liquidity Programs: Why and
How Companies Align the Interests of All Parties, FOUNDERS CIRCLE,
http://www.founderscircle.com/secondary-employee-aligned-liquidity-guide
[https://perma.cc/U3PD-4RBW].
286 BAGLEY & SAVAGE, supra note 46, at 531.
287 RSUs are subject to section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code, and
will be taxed as ordinary income, when the stock is received. BAGLEY &
SAVAGE, supra note 46, at 531.
288 I.R.C. § 409A (West 2017) (including deferred compensation under
nonqualified deferred compensation plans in gross income).
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B. Liquidity Alternatives
Several alternative approaches have also been proposed to
solve the illiquidity problem. These alternatives include direct
listing, the use of electronic secondary markets, secondary
sales to individual buyers, and efforts to allow employees to
gain liquidity while letting founders maintain control289 over
the management of their company.290

1. Direct Listing
Spotify, the Swedish music-streaming-technology unicorn,
went public last year by launching a direct listing on the New

See Nicolas Grabar, David Lopez & Andrea Basham, A Look Under
the Hood of Spotify’s Direct Listing, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE
& FIN. REG. (Apr. 26, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/04/26/alook-under-the-hood-of-spotifys-direct-listing/
[http://perma.cc/BP3DS24B].
290 Before direct listing, tech founders typically used dual class stock.
For more on dual class stock and “minority controlling shareholders” see
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual DualClass Stock, 103 VA. L. REV. 585, 594–95 (2017) (“Furthermore, there has
been an upward trend in the adoption of dual class stock since Google went
public with a dual-class structure in 2004 and was followed by well-known
tech companies, such as Facebook, Groupon, LinkedIn, Snap, Trip Advisor,
and Zynga. Indeed, according to data-provider Dealogic, ‘[m]ore than 13.5
percent of the 133 companies listing shares on United States exchanges in
2015 have set up a dual-class structure . . . compare[d] with . . . just 1
percent in 2005.’”). For a detailed account of the history of dual-class
structures in the United States, see Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in
Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote Controversy,
54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687, 693–707 (1986). For new stock exchange rules
authorizing dual class listings, see Voting Rights, NYSE Listed Company
Manual § 313.00 (2018) (permitting the issuance of multiple classes prior to
the IPO); see also Nasdaq Stock Market Equity Rules § 5640, IM5640,
Voting Rights Policy (2018); Press Release, Council of Institutional Inv’rs,
Institutional Investors Oppose Stitch Fix Dual-Class Structure but
Welcome Sunset Provision, (Nov. 17, 2017), https://advisornews.com/
oarticle/institutional-investors-oppose-stitch-fix-dual-class-structure-butwelcome-sunset-provision#.W-TKzZNKjIU [http://perma.cc/8SGE-4Z4L].
289
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York Stock Exchange,291 in order to “directly match public
buyers with private sellers.” 292 The direct listing allows
Spotify shareholders, investors, and employees to sell shares
in the open public stock market. 293 However, whether unicorn
firms should follow Spotify and use direct listing to facilitate
liquidity depends on the following questions: Did Spotify’s
direct listing serve the interests of the employees and the
firm?294 Did Spotify have an adequate price discovery process?
These questions warrant further research. In addition, unlike
a traditional IPO, direct listing has no book building, and the
financial advisors do not facilitate price discovery (except on
the opening price).295 It is unknown whether other unicorns
will choose this strategy in the future.296

2. Electronic Secondary Markets
The current practice of trading unicorn stocks on electronic
secondary markets increases liquidity for individual investors
but raises several issues. Certain unicorns allow their
employees and capital investors to sell their shares on

291 See Spotify Case Study: Structuring and Executing a Direct Listing,
LATHAM & WATKINS (June 21, 2018), https://www.lw.com/thought
Leadershipspotify-case-study-structuring-executing-direct-listing
[https://perma.cc/Y6BG-YTAS] (“Spotify Technology S.A. went public on
April 3, 2018 through a direct listing of its shares on the New York Stock
Exchange.”).
292 See Samuelson, supra note 28 (“Achieving a high price was nice for
the sellers. It wasn’t all that material for the company.”).
293 Grabar et al., supra note 289 (“Spotify has one shareholder that has
agreed with Spotify to hold onto its shares until 2020—the Chinese internet
giant Tencent, which owns about 9%. The other shareholders have no
similar limitations and no lock-ups.”).
294 See id.
295 See id. Traditionally, companies use book-building price discovery
mechanism. Id.
296 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Spotify Listing: Can an “Underwriterless” IPO Attract Other Unicorns?, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan. 16, 2018),
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2018/01/16/the-spotify-listing-can-anunderwriter-less-ipo-attract-other-unicorns/
[https://perma.cc/W5B96KS9].
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secondary markets, using electronic platforms such as Nasdaq
Private Market (formerly SecondMarket) and SharesPost. 297
On the one hand, the “direct market is improving the
liquidity of start-up stock for locked-in investors by lowering
these transaction costs.”298 On the other, these markets also
expose non-accredited investors to risks and uncertainties,
due to current contractual arrangements and securities and
tax laws.299
These platforms also raise other issues. First, unicorns are
private and therefore their valuations are uncertain. For
instance, a recent study by Gornall and Strabulaev finds huge
discrepancies in the alleged worth of some unicorns, including
Uber.300 Second, both the sellers of the shares (whether
investors or employees) and the unicorn are subject to the risk
of lawsuits by buyers, due to omissions and misstatements,
under the securities law. Finally, unicorns are concerned that
allowing employees to trade on these platforms will trigger
public registration requirements under section 12(g). Finally,
unicorns are concerned that extensive use of these platforms
See Ibrahim, supra note 147, at 22.
Id.
299 See Adi Osovsky, The Curious Case of the Secondary Market with
Respect to Investor Protection, 82 TENN. L. REV. 83, 130 (2014) (“[T]he
democratization of Secondary Market transactions exposes non-accredited
investors to new risks and uncertainties.”); see also Elizabeth Pollman,
Information Issues on Wall Street 2.0, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 182 (2012)
(identifying and analyzing the information issues in the new online
secondary markets).
300 See Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 176. The other restriction is
with regards to companies that use the method of buybacks. “The deferral
election is also not available if the issuing corporation bought back any
outstanding stock in the preceding calendar year[.]” Lieberman, supra note
32; see New Tax Act, supra note 80 (“The legislative history for the TCJA is
silent on why Section 83(i) restricts share repurchases; however, a sponsor
of the Empowering Employees through Stock Ownership Act, which is very
similar to Section 83(i), described employee stock ownership as ‘a key tool
for startups, allowing cash-poor innovators to recruit top talent.’”); see also
Cable, supra note 5; Fan, supra note 5; Frier & Newcomer, supra note 8
(“[I]nvestors agree to grant higher valuations, which help the companies
with recruitment and building credibility[.]”).
297
298
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and the related increase in their record shareholders would
force them into an IPO.301

3. Secondary Sale to a Single Buyer
Unicorns are under pressure to seek liquidity. Therefore,
in practice, many unicorns choose to facilitate a secondary
sale of employees’ shares to a single buyer (or an existing
shareholder), so that the sale does not violate section 12(g).302
For example, on December 28, 2017, a number of Uber 303
shareholders, including Uber employees and early stage
investors, were finally able to liquidate a portion of their
shares via the tender offer of the Japanese technology
conglomerate SoftBank.304 Just a few weeks earlier, news
broke that Uber employees were lining up to sell their stock
to SoftBank. Some of these employees had to take on loans to
exercise their options because they could not sell their shares

See Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Keynote Address at the SEC-Rock
Center on Corporate Governance Silicon Valley Initiative (Mar. 31, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/chair-white-silicon-valley-initiative-3-3116.html [https://perma.cc/ap47-xd3w].
302 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. 112-106 § 501, 126
Stat. 306, 325 (2012).
303 Griswold, supra note 33.
304 See Katie Roof, SoftBank’s Big Investment in Uber Comes to a Close,
TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 28, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/12/28/softbanksbig-investment-in-uber-comes-to-a-close/
[https://perma.cc/V3EC-74ZN];
see also Greg Bensinger & Liz Hoffman, SoftBank Succeeds in Tender Offer
for Large Stake in Uber, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 28, 2017),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/softbank-succeeds-in-tender-offer-for-largestake-in-uber-1514483283 (on file with the Columbia Business Law
Review); Lieberman, supra note 32 (“The new rule evolved from a 2016
Senate bill sponsored by Senators Mark Warner and Dean Heller, the
Empowering Employees Through Stock Ownership Act (SB3152), and a
companion House bill (HR5719). The purpose was to provide an extended
deferral period of up to seven years for employees who exercise options to
buy the stock of private companies to ease the tax burden arising from
equity grants covering shares that are not publicly traded.”).
301

No. 1:107]

UNICORN STOCK OPTIONS

175

in the open market.305 Luckily for these306 Uber employees
and investors, the deal went through and the tender offer
provided them with an opportunity to liquidate and recover
their upfront investment.307 But what about all the other
employees that were not permitted to participate, even on a
pro rata basis?

V. RECOMMENDATIONS
In order to remove legal barriers to private ordering, this
Article postulates that the current regulatory models need
urgent amendments and comprehensive reform. The recent
piecemeal amendments to the federal securities and tax laws
do not solve the problems that unicorn firms are experiencing
with attracting, engaging, and retaining talent. They also
contribute to the unicorn employees’ conflict of expectations
and, as a result, the unicorn firms continue to renegotiate
labor contracts with their employees.
305 New research studies examine the fair market value of startups
worth over $1 billion. For instance, Gornall and Strebulaev find huge
discrepancies in their purported worth. See Gornall & Strebulaev, supra
note 176. On the skepticism about unicorn reported valuations, see also
Robert P. Bartlett, III, A Founder’s Guide to Unicorn Creation: How
Liquidation Preferences in M&A Transactions Affect Start-up Valuation, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 123 (Claire A. Hill &
Steven David Solomon eds., 2016) (“[A]chieving unicorn status provides a
firm with added visibility to prospective employees and customers, giving it
a potential competitive advantage over rival firms.”); see also Cable, supra
note 5; Fan, supra note 5; Frier & Newcomer, supra note 8 (“[I]nvestors
agree to grant higher valuations, which help the companies with
recruitment and building credibility”).
306 Current Uber employees were only allowed to sell half of their stake
in the company, whereas former employees had no restrictions. Griswold,
supra note 33.
307 See id. (“To qualify for the tender offer, participants must have at
least 10,000 Uber shares and be ‘accredited investors,’ an SEC designation
. . . for wealthy individuals.”); see Ilya Strebulaev, Fair Value of Uber
Estimated
at
$49
Billion,
LINKEDIN
(Jan.
31,
2018),
https://conferences.law.stanford.edu/vcs/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2017
/11/Fair-Value-of-Uber-Estimated-at-49-Billion-_-LinkedIn.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DM3J-HPU6]; see also Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note
176.
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Specifically, with regard to the tax law, section 83 needs to
be amended to address current issues that employees and
firms are dealing with in these new market dynamics.
Securities law needs more transparency and information. The
first step in this direction is to amend the law to count the
number of employees towards the threshold of registration
with the SEC.

A. Corporate Governance and Protection of Minority
Shareholders
Unicorns are private firms with concentrated ownership.
Should the law provide additional protection to the employees
as minority shareholders? If so, what kind of protections
would help?
It is necessary to protect unicorn employee-investors’
collective interests for the following reasons. First, the
employees (other than founders and senior managers) who are
granted equity compensation are usually minority
shareholders, if they hold shares at all, limiting their ability
to use their votes or voice to influence company actions. As
noted above, they are locked-in and cannot easily redeem their
investment.
Second, the JOBS Act has extended the number of
investors allowed in private companies before periodic reports
are required under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.308
The increase in the number of non-traditional investors may
create collective action problems. Due to this increase,
investors may tend to be more rationally apathetic.
The intention and rationale behind the JOBS Act change
is to facilitate emerging growth companies’ “access to the
public capital markets.” 309 One way the Act attempted to do
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 501,
126 Stat. 306, 325 (2012).
309 Rose & Solomon, supra note 163, at 84; see also Usha Rodrigues,
Securities Law’s Dirty Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3389 (2013); Robert
B. Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort, Rewarding the Public-Private
Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital Raising, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1573
(2013); Usha Rodrigues, The JOBS Act at Work, CONGLOMERATE (Sept. 11,
308
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so was by reducing some of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act regulatory
requirements in the hope of encouraging private companies to
go public.310
The JOBS Act’s biggest achievement is “radical
deregulation”311 by exempting more private firms from
complying
with
the
federal
periodic
disclosure
312
requirements.
U.S. firms have been subjected to these
requirements since 1964.313 For example, as mentioned above,
the JOBS Act changed the threshold that triggers registration
with the SEC. Employees receiving equity grants no longer
count as investors, and the number of accredited investors
that necessitates certain public reporting increased from 500
to 2,000.314
2015), http://www.theconglomerate.org/jobs-act/ [https://perma.cc/6WZLNYGS] (criticizing the JOBS Act’s unrealistic endeavors to boost IPOs).
310 See Solomon & Rose, supra note 163, at 3 (“The JOBS Act is
primarily a response to the regulatory theory, but also takes some aims
towards market structure by loosening restrictions on research analysts.”).
311 See Examining Investor Risks in Capital Raising: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., and Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., &
Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 4–6 (2011) (statement of John Coates, Professor
of Law and Economics, Harvard Law School) (noting that the provisions
changing the shareholders of record trigger were “the most risky of the
proposals” and provided an example of “radical deregulation”). Coates also
suggested the need to use a better measure of share ownership than the
increasingly antiquated concept of “record holders,” and offered as
alternatives a firm’s public float or market valuation. Id.; see also Michael
D. Guttentag, Patching a Hole in the JOBS Act: How and Why to Rewrite
the Rules That Require Firms to Make Periodic Disclosures, 88 IND. L.J. 151,
175 (2013).
312 See Guttentag, supra note 311, at 152 (“Firms were first federally
required to publicly disclose information on an ongoing basis with the
passage of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934[.]”).
313 For more on federal periodic disclosure requirements (“FDPRs")
compliance and history, see id. at 153 (“After almost eighty years of federal
rules requiring firms of various types to comply with FPDRs and a recently
enacted substantial change to these rules, how best to determine when firms
should be required to comply with these FPDRs still remains largely an
enigma.”).
314 See Garrett A. DeVries, SEC Approves Final Rules Implementing
JOBS Act and FAST Act, AKIN GUMP (May 13, 2016),
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Although the JOBS Act sought to boost the IPO market, it
unfortunately leaves employees vulnerable as investors in
their companies and subject them to the discretion of majority
shareholders. Historically, according to Fan315 and Cable,316
the securities laws were designed to protect employees.
However, as a result of the deregulation efforts in the last few
years, it is less likely that privately held unicorns will have to
provide their employees with disclosure and information. 317
Other authors consider employees of startups as insiders
(sometimes even as gamblers or lottery winners) who are wellpositioned to monitor their company’s progress.318
https://www.akingump.com/en/experience/practices/corporate/ag-dealdiary/sec-approves-final-rules-implementing-jobs-act-and-fast-act.html
[https://perma.cc/2YWE-REKC].
315 See Fan, supra note 5 (recommending that unicorn companies be
subject to a scaled disclosure regime); see also Pollman, supra note 299
(exploring the development of secondary markets for startup company stock
and suggesting scaled disclosure requirements); Jeff Schwartz, The Law
and Economics of Scaled Equity Market Regulation, 39 J. CORP. L. 347
(2014) (outlining the costs and benefits of scaled regulation of large private
companies); Jeff Schwartz, The Twilight of Equity Liquidity, 34 CARDOZO L.
REV. 531 (2012) (arguing for a “lifecycle model” of securities regulation that
would adapt to firm age); Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 309 at 1625–
27 (calling for legislative reforms to reduce regulation for large private
companies and advocates for enhanced regulation of broker-dealers as an
alternative approach).
316 Cable, supra note 5, at 616.
317 See id. (“Private placement regulation, like other areas of law,
traditionally viewed employees as vulnerable . . . . In recent decades,
however, the [SEC] and Congress have essentially deregulated equity
compensation by providing increasingly generous registration exemptions
for equity grants to service providers. What is the basis for this policy
change?”).
318 For further discussion on employee incentives, see generally Robert
Anderson IV, Employee Incentives and the Federal Securities Laws, 57 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1195 (2003) (discussing the status of employee options as
securities); Matthew T. Bodie, Aligning Incentives with Equity: Employee
Stock Options and Rule 10b-5, 88 IOWA L. REV. 539 (2003) (focusing on the
availability of Rule 10b-5 actions); Jensen & Murphy, supra note 14, at 138
(advocating for equity compensation as a form of incentive-based executive
pay); Smith, supra note 14 (focusing on the law and economics of equity
compensation as private ordering).
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Presumably their economic incentives are aligned with the
those of the founders’. Moreover, employees are protected by
investors, such as VC investors, who can sanction the
founders for bad behavior. Even if this may be the case for
employees of small or medium-sized startups, this is not true
for unicorn employees who work for larger, quasi-public
companies.319
Third, mutual funds often have aggressive redemption
rights.320 In the event that mutual fund investors exercise
these rights, by asking to redeem their investment and cash
out, the unicorn can face cash shortages and will most likely
be compelled to raise new capital under unfavorable terms, if
it is available at all. It is also very likely that the firm will go
bankrupt. Although VCs sometimes also have redemption
rights, they have rarely utilized them.321 Open-ended mutual
funds may be more likely to demand redemption in a down
market to raise the cash necessary to fund redemptions by
their own shareholders.
Finally, founders are sometimes able to control the board
of directors with super voting rights or other arrangements,
which enhance their power within the firm. It is also
questionable whether the interests of all common
shareholders are aligned. A university endowment fund may
be a more patient investor than a cash-strapped individual
trying to buy a house or fund a child’s education.
Despite these issues, regulators and policymakers keep
promulgating new regulations that enable companies to raise

See Cable, supra note 5, at 616–17.
Chernenko et al., supra note 4, at 32 (“Having to carefully manage
their own liquidity, mutual funds require stronger redemption rights along
both the intensive and extensive margins, suggesting contractual choices
consistent with the funds’ reliance on redeemable funding.”).
321 See Giulio Girardi, Christof W. Stahel & Youchang Wu, Cash
Management and Extreme Liquidity Demand of Mutual Funds 1 (June 21,
2017)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://www.sec.gov/files/DERA_
WP_Girardi-Stahel-Wu_Cash%20Management%20and%20Extreme%20
Liquidity%20Demand.pdf (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review).
319
320
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large amounts of private capital. 322 In fact, the SEC is
working on new rules that are intended to open up private
markets to non-accredited investors. One of the issues that
the SEC will confront is whether unicorns “should have an
easier way to compensate their workers by giving them stock
in the company.” 323

B. Reform to Recent Regulatory & Legislative
Developments
This Section provides examples of current legislation that
are meant to continue to tie employees to these private
companies, even though employees are experiencing liquidity
challenges, their ownership is subject to forfeiture (in the
event they leave the company), and their equity ownership
does not typically come with voting or monitoring rights.
Other means of averting knowledge leakage, such as noncompete provisions, are not enforceable in California except in
connection with the sale of an entire business.324 The
illiquidity problem for unicorn shares has therefore affected
the ability of startups to attract, retain, and engage talent. In
order to continue to attract talent by providing equity
322 The other legislation includes: (1) the Financial CHOICE Act of
2017, which includes modernizing the Regulation D offering process and
creates “venture exchanges;” and (2) crowdfunding regulations that were
adopted by the SEC that allow companies to use a crowdfunding platform
(as an intermediary) for raising small amounts of equity capital (less than
$1 million dollars annually) from potentially large pools of investors over
the internet. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Investor and Market Protection
in the Crowdfunding Era: Disclosing to and for the “Crowd,” 38 VT. L. REV.
827, 830 (2014). Regulation A+ of Title IV of the JOBS Act also increased
the cap on a private company’s unregistered public offering to $50 million
in any twelve-month period. However, companies raising capital under
Regulation D can only accept investments from accredited investors and a
limited number of non-accredited investors, whereas companies that use
Regulation A+ are able to accept funds from the public in larger
numbers, including from both accredited and non-accredited investors. See
Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 309.
323 See Michaels, supra note 17.
324 See Lazonick, supra note 43.
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compensation, various interest groups, including the National
Venture Capital Association and unicorn founders, have been
lobbying Congress for new laws and regulations.325

1. Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and
Consumer Protection Act
On May 24, 2018, President Trump signed into law the
Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer
Protection Act (the “Economic Growth Act”).326 This act
requires the SEC to amend Rule 701327 under Regulation D to
increase, from $5 million to $10 million, the amount of
securities that an eligible non-public company can offer or sell
to employees for compensatory purposes (including stock
options and restricted stock units) during a twelve-month
period without having to register the securities under the
Securities Act of 1933. 328
Although the SEC initially adopted Rule 701 in 1988 to
promote entrepreneurship by reducing the securities-law
compliance costs borne by small and medium-sized non-public

325 Press Release, Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, House Bill to Defer Tax
Liability on Startup Stock Options Will Strengthen Entrepreneurial
Ecosystem (Sep. 14, 2016), https://nvca.org/pressreleases/house-bill-defertax-liability-startup-stock-options-will-strengthen-entrepreneurialecosystem/ [https://perma.cc/J856-YWYC].
326 See Samuel R. Woodall III, Mitchell S. Eitel, Michael T. Escue, C.
Andrew Gerlach, Camille L. Orme, Benjamin H. Weiner & Michael A.
Wiseman, “Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection
Act” is Enacted, PROGRAM ON CORP. COMPLIANCE & ENFORCEMENT BLOG AT
N.Y.U. SCH. OF L. (JUNE 5, 2018), https://wp.nyu.edu/compliance_
enforcement/2018/06/05/economic-growth-regulatory-relief-and-consumerprotection-act-is-enacted/ [https://perma.cc/AKG9-VPTT].
327 See Gary Shorter, Employee Ownership of Registration-Exempt
Company Securities: Proposals to Reform Required Corporate Disclosures
(Section 507 of S. 2155, S. 488, H.R. 1343, and Section 406 of H.R. 10), FED’N
AM. SCIENTISTS (Apr. 3, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IN10680.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F422-CNEK].
328 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.701 (2018).
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companies,329 the heightened threshold applies to unicorns
and other large, privately held companies.
By raising the employee sales cap to $10 million, Congress
has encouraged employees to share in the ownership of even
very large firms330 without requiring the companies to provide
enhanced disclosure. This limits employees’ ability to make
informed decisions about whether to exercise their options
and buy illiquid unicorn stock. Unicorns that remain below
the $10 million threshold are required to provide their
employees only with a copy of the benefit plan (or
compensatory contract) under which their securities were
granted.331 If unicorns do not limit their employee offerings to
come within the new $10 million threshold, then and only
then, will they be required to provide their employees with
detailed financial statements and risk factor disclosures.332
The Economic Growth Act makes it easier for unicorn firms
to stay private longer without addressing the illiquidity issues
employees face when deciding whether to exercise employee
stock options. Further, it leaves employees holding potentially
tens of millions of dollars of illiquid stock at the mercy of the
majority, without access to detailed financial statements or
adequate disclosures of risks and prospectuses to help guide
their investment decisions. This law encourages employees to

329 Exempt Offerings Pursuant to Compensatory Arrangements, 83
Fed. Reg. 34,940 (July 24, 2018).
330 See DAVID W. PERKINS, DARRYL E. GETTER, MARC LABONTE, GARY
SHORTER, EVA SU & N. ERIC WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45073,
ECONOMIC GROWTH, REGULATORY RELIEF, AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
(P.L.
115-174)
AND
SELECTED
POLICY
ISSUES
(2018),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45073.pdf [https://perma.cc/AL32-8DLM].
331 See Erin Randolph-Williams, Alan Singer & Lauren E. Sullivan,
Major Change in Rule 701 Disclosure Requirements, MORGAN LEWIS
BLOG (June 21, 2018), https://www.morganlewis.com/blogs/mlbenebits/
2018/06/major-change-in-rule-701-disclosure-requirements
[https://perma.cc/4SVC-D8VH]; Shorter, supra note 327.
332 For purposes of Rule 701’s limitations on sales and the enhanced
disclosure threshold, a sale is deemed to occur at the time of the grant of a
stock option rather than at the time of exercise of the option. See RandolphWilliams et al., supra note 331.
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accept their firm’s stock rather than diversify their
investments.333
The purpose of the recent amendments to the securities
laws was to give young startup companies time to mature and
become more attractive as IPO candidates. Unfortunately,
these amendments also created a problem for the firms and
their employees. They did not take into account that employee
stock options expire during this period.

i. Mandatory Disclosure Requirements
One of the main problems with unicorn employee stock
option plans is that employees are uninformed about their
rights and the status of the company. In order to make an
investment decision to exercise or forfeit their options, they
need information.334 Unicorn firms rely on the exemption
under Rule 701 to not provide employees with enhanced
disclosure. This must change.335 These firms must provide
employees with enhanced information, especially concerning
the risks associated with investing in illiquid securities of a
high-risk venture that is often controlled by founders who lack

333 See Legislative Proposals to Enhance Capital Formation and Reduce
Regulatory Burdens, Part II, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts.
and Gov’t Sponsored Enters., H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 114th Cong. 22
(2015) (statement of Mercer E. Bullard, President and Founder, Fund
Democracy, Inc. and MDLA Distinguished Lecturer and Professor of Law,
University of Mississippi School of Law), https://financialservices.house.
gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-114-ba16-wstate-mbullard-20150513.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Business Law Review) (“Rule 701 offerings should
‘encourage’ offerings that actually increase the number of employees who
own company stock while ‘discouraging’ offerings that result in
overconcentration in the percentage of employees’ portfolios invested in
company stock. The Encouraging Employee Ownership Act does precisely
the opposite.”).
334 The U.S. Supreme Court made it clear that employee status, taken
alone, does not guarantee access to material information. SEC v. Ralston
Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953).
335 See STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION 23
(2008). The purpose of the Securities Act of 1933 is “[t]o provide full and fair
disclosure of the character of securities sold.” Id.
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management experience.336 At least some level of disclosure
(or a fairness hearing conducted under a new federal provision
akin to section 3(b) of the Securities Act of 1933) should be
mandated, and could perhaps be included in state blue sky
laws.337 This would most likely require tweaks to federal law
to avoid federal preemption, but to avoid an overly onerous
process, the state and federal laws could be amended to permit
those states with at least a designated percentage of the
employees (perhaps thirty-three percent) to require disclosure
or a fairness hearing. Further, only firms with outstanding
equity issued for at least a specified amount (perhaps $200
million) should be subject to the highest level of disclosure.
In order to mitigate some of the risks that are associated
with their employees’ investment, the mandatory disclosures
should include the following information to employees. First,
in addition to the stock option purchase agreement and plan,
the firm should provide a schedule with the amount of capital
that was raised by the company prior to that point. The
schedule should include a list of investors that received
liquidation preferences, and founders that were granted super
voting common stock.

336 See Eric Newcomer & Joel Rosenblatt, Here’s the Uber Investor Letter
That Forced Travis Kalanick Out, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 28, 2019),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-28/here-s-the-uberinvestor-letter-that-forced-travis-kalanick-out
[https://perma.cc/KKZ4ASKX].
337 The California Corporations Code gives the Commissioner of
Corporations the authority to conduct such hearings in the case of securities
issuances in connection with mergers and other business combinations. See
Corporations Fairness Hearings, CAL. DEP’T OF BUS. OVERSIGHT,
http://www.dbo.ca.gov/ENF/FairnessHearings/Default.asp
[https://perma.cc/DJ8R-L9MZ](“California Corporations Code section
25142 allows companies interested in issuing securities in a merger or
conducting an exchange of outstanding securities to seek a ‘fairness’ hearing
as part of its application for qualification of the offer and sale of securities.
By this process, applicants may seek an exemption from federal registration
as provided by Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Act of 1933 through a statelaw hearing on the fairness of the terms and conditions of the proposed
issuance or exchange of securities.”).
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Second, the firm should disclose to employees how much
debt it has accumulated, including debt evidenced by
convertible or SAFE notes. Third, if companies allow
employees to trade on secondary platforms, the companies
should provide appropriate disclosures, including any
restrictions on resale, to make sure that employees
understand and comply with the applicable securities
regulations. If the companies do not allow employees to trade
on secondary platforms, they should consider facilitating
private secondary market sales or stock buybacks to provide
liquidity.338
Fourth, disclosure should include information on the
composition and compensation of the management team,
information concerning current and future stock and debt
issuances, a list of investors holding more than a specified
percentage (perhaps one percent) of the outstanding stock
(including their liquidation preferences and conversion
rights), and a quarterly estimated fair market value of the
stock. They should also provide employees with the assistance
of an experienced and independent purchaser representative.
Finally, unicorns should be required to be audited by an
independent auditor before issuing equity compensation to
unaccredited or unsophisticated purchasers above a stated
threshold amount. If a company is raising money at a billiondollar valuation, the cost of such an audit should not be overly
burdensome. The employees granted equity compensation
should have access to and be entitled to rely on these reports.
These disclosures can improve efficiency and reduce
information asymmetries, and produce increasingly equitable
and sustainable employee participation in unicorn companies.

338 See Ric Marshall, Panos Seretis & Agnes Grunfeld, Taking Stock:
Share Buybacks and Shareholder Value, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 19, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.
edu/2018/08/19/taking-stock-share-buybacks-and-shareholder-value/
(on
file with the Columbia Business Law Review) (finding no compelling
evidence of a negative impact from share buybacks on long-term value
creation for investors overall).
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ii. Naïve Employees
Rule 701 was intended for small businesses and not large,
cash-hoarding unicorns. Rank-and-file employees might be
naïve investors,339 and, although they are insiders in the firm,
they will need to decide whether to exercise or forfeit their
options without a guarantee that there will be an IPO in the
future. Additionally, most employees would not be able to
bargain away from the predominant practice of equity
incentive plans, because to do so might send a hostile signal
to the market and to their employer, which they would like to
avoid.340
Perhaps the approach should go even further, and require
that unicorns adhere to the same financial disclosure
requirements
as public companies.
Mandating
such
disclosure might encourage unicorns to do an IPO, as they will
be required to incur the expenses and disclosure obligations of
public companies. Facebook, for example, did an IPO because
it had reached the maximum threshold of shareholders of
record (then 500) and thus was forced to become a “reporting”
company under section 12(g) of the 1934 Act.341 Once
Facebook was required to adhere to these financial disclosure
requirements, the downsides of an IPO were limited, and the
company went public.

339 For more on naïve employees, see Ryan Bubb, Patrick Corrigan &
Patrick L. Warren, A Behavioral Contract Theory Perspective on Retirement
Savings, 47 CONN. L. REV. 1317, 1323 (2015), who criticize federal
retirement plans policy. They postulate that employees are naïve and the
current structure of the labor market gives employers strong incentives to
offer matching contributions that exploit the employees. See id.
340 See Rock & Wachter, supra note 101.
341 See Government-Business Forum on Small Business Capital
Formation: Hearing Before the Securities and Exchange Commission (2011)
(Capital Formation, Job Creation and Congress: Private Versus Public
Markets, statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law,
Columbia University Law School, and Director of its Center on Corporate
Governance), https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/sbforum111711-materialscoffee.pdf [https://perma.cc/PTY2-V2D7].
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2. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
The National Venture Capital Association and the
company Palantir Technologies (a well-known Silicon Valley
data analytics unicorn)342 registered to lobby Congress on
both the House and Senate versions of the Empowering
Employees Through Stock Ownership Act.343 The new Tax Act
incorporated certain sections from both versions of this act.
The purpose of these changes was to encourage broad based
equity compensation, incentivize employees to take an
ownership stake in their firms by providing an extended
deferral period, and allow startups to continue to use options
as a tool to attract, retain and engage talent.
One important change in the new Tax Act was in the new
Internal Revenue Code section 83(i), which allows individuals,
if certain conditions are met (such as the underlying stock is

342 Palantir is a data analytics unicorn that got an early investment (in
2005) from In-Q-Tel, the CIA’s venture capital arm. See William Alden,
Palantir’s Relationship with America’s Spies Has Been Worse than You’d
Think, CNBC (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/21/buzzfeedpalantir-loses-relationship-with-nsa-ceo-karp-bashes-trump.html (on file
with the Columbia Business Law Review); see also Paul Szoldra, 14 Cutting
Edge Firms Funded by the CIA, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 21, 2016),
http://www.businessinsider.com/companies-funded-by-cia-2016-9
[https://perma.cc/29FT-SA72]. For more on In-Q-Tel, see Anat Alon-Beck,
The Coalition Model, a Private-Public Strategic Innovation Policy Model for
Encouraging Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth in the Era of New
Economic Challenges, 17 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 267, 300–01
(2018). During the time of its establishment, the idea of a governmentfunded venture capital firm was entirely novel. See Steve Henn, In-Q-Tel:
The CIA’s Tax-Funded Player In Silicon Valley, NPR (July 16, 2012),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2012/07/16/156839153/in-q-telthe-cias-tax-funded-player-in-silicon-valley [https://perma.cc/8SPA-G52K]
(“Much of the touch-screen technology used now in iPads and other things
came out of various companies that In-Q-Tel identified.”); see also JOSH
LERNER, BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS 176 (2012) (“[T]he challenges of
breaking into government procurements were daunting.”); see also Palantir
Technologies, CB INSIGHTS, https://www.cbinsights.com/company/palantirtechnologies [http://perma.cc/T6EN-JF37].
343 See McKenna, supra note 181.
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eligible stock and the corporation is an eligible corporation),344
to defer tax liability on the income earned from exercising
options (or settlement of RSUs) for up to five years. 345 This
intended to mitigate the problem described above concerning
NSOs (and RSUs). Once employees exercise their options (or
settle their RSUs), they have to pay tax immediately on profit
that might never materialize. Employees have to pay out of
pocket for both the strike price and the tax, and some
employees might not be able to raise enough cash to pay for
these expenses due to their firms’ high valuations.346

344 The conditions include: (1) the underlying stock must be eligible
stock; and (2) the corporation must be an eligible corporation. “The new rule
evolved from a 2016 Senate bill, sponsored by Senators Mark Warner and
Dean Heller, the Empowering Employees Through Stock Ownership Act
(SB3152), and a companion House bill (HR5719).” Lieberman, supra note
32.
345 If an employee with ISOs will choose to make a section 83(i) election,
it will negate the preferential tax treatment, and will convert the ISO to an
NSO. Id. The other restriction is with regards to companies that use the
method of buybacks.

The deferral election is also not available if the issuing
corporation bought back any outstanding stock in the
preceding calendar year, unless not less than 25% of the
total amount the company bought back is stock for which a
Section 83(i) deferral election is in effect and the buyback’s
eligibility criteria are made on a reasonable (nondiscretionary) basis.
Id.
346 See Practical Implications of Section 83(i) Option and RSU Tax
Deferral, WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI (June 19, 2018),
https://www.wsgr.com/WSGR/Display.aspx?SectionName=publications/PD
FSearch/wsgralert-section-83i.htm
[https://perma.cc/52MC-DGL2].
Exercising incentive stock options can trigger the alternative minimum tax.
See
Fundamentals
of
Equity
Compensation,
PAYSA,
https://www.paysa.com/resources/fundamentals-of-equity-compensation
[https://perma.cc/DKW3-X9J8]. Although Congress did not repeal the
alternative minimum tax, it significantly increased the income exemption
and phase-out amounts, leaving fewer startup employees who receive stock
options subject to the tax. See Six Ways Tax Reform Affects Your Stock
Compensation
and
Financial
Planning,
MYSTOCKOPTIONS.COM,
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As noted above, some unicorns allow their employees to sell
the share on secondary market platforms,347 but this
approach is not efficient. Section 83(i) discourages this
practice, and a unicorn that allows its employees to trade on
a secondary market platform will not be able to use this new
deferral.348
Section 83(i) is also not applicable to early employees who
made a section 83(b) election.349 As a result, early startup
employees are often chained by golden handcuffs, and it is
possible that many of them started working for the startup
without knowing that it would turn into a unicorn. Many
startups encourage early employees to make an 83(b)
election., which allows employees to exercise their options
before they are vested, so that they can pay taxes before the
vesting date, when the stock has not appreciated yet.350
Time and future Treasury Department regulations will tell
whether this change will make it easier for unicorn employers
to continue to use equity compensation plans as a retention
tool. There are several issues that need to be clarified. For
example, according to the current statutory language, it is not
clear if the five-year period begins from the vesting or exercise
date. Additionally, the section requires companies to
determine and monitor the eligibility of their employees (and
themselves) and become subject to additional tax reporting.351
https://www.mystockoptions.com/articles/index.cfm/ObjectID/22615723D31E-CCDF-68284D3C456C3E3A [https://perma.cc/HJ6Z-ANGT].
347 See Eliot Brown & Greg Bensinger, The Latest Path to Silicon Valley
Riches: Stake Sales, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 19, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/investment-firms-buy-stock-in-startups-long-before-ipos1511045818 (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review).
348 See New Tax Act, supra note 80 (“The drafters of the bill may have
thought that companies that have enough cash to repurchase shares should
have enough cash to net settle employee stock options and RSUs and
therefore should not be the beneficiaries of a tax deferral opportunity for
‘cash-poor innovators.’”)
349 See Practical Implications of Section 83(i) Option and RSU Tax
Deferral, supra note 346; see also Fosse & Garrett, supra note 257.
350 See New Tax Act, supra note 80.
351 See New Tax Act, supra note 80.
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There is a need for guidance on whether or not unicorn
employees that trade on secondary markets can use section
83(i). Currently, companies with stock traded on an
“established securities market” cannot use this new section,
and practitioners interpret this limitation to include
secondary markets.352
One of the main requirements is that the company must
offer the options (or RSUs) to eighty percent of its
employees.353 Some companies might not use it, as it broadens
their shareholder base. Moreover, companies also have to
comply with other existing U.S. federal and state “blue sky”
securities laws, which might preclude companies from using
such broad-based issuance of options or RSUs to employees.
Section 83(i) also restricts two recent practices that allow
private companies to give a temporary liquidity event to
employees. It restricts a company’s ability to do a stock
repurchase, and it does not allow employees to sell on
secondary market platforms, in the previous calendar year.
Section 83(i) allows some employees to defer some of the
tax liability for up to five years, but it does not solve the urgent
need for liquidity. There are several problems that can arise
after an employee makes the deferral. First, if after five years,
there is no imminent liquidity event and the company elects
to stay private longer, the employee is again faced with a
dilemma—to forfeit or to exercise? Employees again will have
to pay the taxes in cash without knowing whether the imputed
gain will ultimately be realized. Second, if, after the deferral,
there is a loss (because the value of the stock has diminished),
the employee is still obligated to pay taxes on the exercise or
vesting.

352 See Lydia O’Neal, New Tax Law’s Equity Grant Rule Not Too Useful
for Startups, BLOOMBERG BNA (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.bna.com/newtax-laws-n73014474870/ [https://perma.cc/NV5R -WE89].
353 See New Tax Act, supra note 80.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In the new economy, knowledgeable employees are
incredibly important to the firm, as their knowledge
contributes to the firm’s intangible assets. 354 To attract,
engage, and retain talent, unicorn firms must find ways to
continue to offer employees equity (and a promise of equity)
and facilitate liquidity opportunities.
There are legal barriers to private ordering, which
preclude unicorn firms from using traditional employee stock
option plans. The recent piecemeal amendments to the federal
securities and tax laws, which attempted to remove these
barriers, have not been beneficial and have contributed to the
issues that were raised herein. A comprehensive regulatory
and legislative reform is needed. Finally,
by
providing
employees with liquidity and adequate disclosures that can
improve efficiency and reduce information asymmetries,
unicorns, as well as their managers and boards, will reduce
the likelihood of massive fraud. Liquidity opportunities and
information will encourage employees to continue to exchange
their creativity and hard work for the equity needed for the
game-changing innovations necessary for American
competitiveness in the global marketplace. 355

354 For example, the intangible assets can take the form of a patent, a
trade secret, or a list of customers. See DELONG, supra note 58, at 7. (“Much
of the capital value of the company may reside in the brains of the workers,
not in identifiable physical capital.”).
355 As so aptly put in Basic v. Levinson, “Who would knowingly throw
the dice in a crooked crap game?” 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988).

